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INTRODUCTORY NOTE: TERMINOLOGY
We shall discuss some political vocabulary later but
the term 'limited community* had better be explained at
once. It will be used here to refer to a community limited
in point of size to something less than the whole of the
human race. That is to say a community co-existing, at least
potentially, with other politically distinct communities
on earth.
Further clarification is needed. The word 'community*
has been chosen chiefly for its negative merits in comparison
with rival designations such as 'association', 'society', or
'state*. All these words have been shown to be open to
innumerable definitions. Gilby in his study of Aquinas,
Between Community and society, would have pure community to
signify a mere mas3 of humans, of 'cyphers', and pure society
to mean "the spiritual association, the exemplar of all human
relationships."^- To designate the political body, which is
said to oscillate between these two extremes, one imagines
that he would welcome a fresh term. But choosing between the
same two he uses 'political community*, and it is, probably,
the least misleading word for the purpose.
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♦Society', as Gilby's definitions assert and as the
common contrasting of 'society' and 'the state* (e.g. by
Barker) implies, has perhaps an even stronger non-political
connotation than a political one.
■**' *•
The word 'state', also, has two important and distinct
meanings, commonly confused. It denotes a certain body of
people; It also denotes a power-structure springing from
that body, which (in our view) may or may not constitute the
whole of the power-structure by which the body is affected.
For example New York State may, we consider, be described
as a state in both senses. But some, holding that the word
'state' implies the possession of what they term complete
sovereignty, would say that New York State was not really
a state at all. The substitution for 'community' of the terra
'state' in anything but its broadest, "New York" sense, would
constrain the discussion; its use in that sense, on the
other hand, would tend to prejudge an issue that is really
bound up with a definition of 'sovereignty'.
What of 'association', which Mabbott recently put
forward as the best general term?2 It is preferable to
♦society*, but the term 'limited association* could be
interpreted, more easily than 'lira!ted community', to allude
to some limitation of the degree of fellowship indulged in
by citizens. And this, of course, is not the sort of
limitation to which we refer.
3
'Community' is a vague term, but it holds no
un-politioal bias like the word 'society' and no ambiguity
so sharp as does 'state'. Probably a remark of Maelver's
concerning it will form a definition enough for our purpose:
"A community is more than any organisation, it is the matrix
of organisation."3 Our aim then in dealing with the
contrasting theories of Rousseau and Locke will be to
examine the connection between the kinds of organisation
they tried to construct and the limited siae of the moulds
they elected to use.
4
1. BEFORE LOCKS AND HOUSSMU
It may be useful briefly to recall the part played by
the concept of a limited community in some political theories
prior to those of Locke and Pousseau,
In the moat representative theories of classical times
the limited community idea was fundamental. The united polis,
holding except in the case of Athens well under three
hundred thousand people, is the ideal put forward alike by
Pericles, by Plato (who in the Laws would limit the number
of citizen families to five thousand and forty) and by
Aristotle. When Aristotle says that "the polls is by physis"
he means not merely that man fulfils his 'nature' in some
sort of community, but that he fulfils it In a community of
a special and clearly limited kind: the city-state. Yet in a
sense this assumption of limitation is so imnllcit that it
might be unfair to say that Plato and Aristotle rejected the
alternatives. More probably the alternatives appeared unreal.
The concept of a community less limited than the polis
for example a nation-state was likely to appear as something
known only to barbarians, and the concept of a community
entirely unlimited as something merely whimsical.
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The approach shown in the Politics sustains this view.
Superficially Aristotle could hardly come down more strongly
in favour of a small community. Not only does he demonstrate
that the polls is naturul in its growth (e.g., "it is the
completion of associations existing by nature.... the end or
consummation towards which those associations move"4} but he
brings forward the even more powerful teleological argument,
in favour of the polls* natural character his view of it
as a whole prior to its parts, a final cause, a perfect form
latent within all the matter which moves sua snonte towards
it. Yet it is worth remembering that the polls is said to
be a 'whole* because it allegedly brings about self-sufficiency;
ana although Aristotle apparently managed to overlook the
practical difficulties then attached to this view for
example the political and economic impact of one city upon
another it is at least possible that in the conditions
of the modern world his own teleological theory would have
encouraged him to advocate an unlimited community, as the
only self-suffioient whole now feasible. In any case the
chief classical political theories, if relevant to the modern
nation-state, are clearly likely to have relevance also for
a still larger community.5
The polis was in one way becoming defunct even while
Aristotle taught, for though his pupil Alexander may have
projected the foundation of a chain of cities on the Greek
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model, these towns would not be the independent city-
states of the past. Some new philosophy was needed to
meet the changed situation, first in Greece and later,
especially In the imperial period, in Rome. Such a
philosophy wa3 not achieved by the Cynics and Epicureans,
whose effect was essentially negative: politically these
two schools represented merely a rather escapist reaction
from city-state ideology. But the new theory was provided
to a considerable extent by Alexander himself. Alexander
lent the encouragement not only of his achievements but
even more of his ideas. Basic to these ideas was the
conception of homonoia, a union of his peoples in heart
and mind. His vision fell short of the Stoic one5 but from
it, as expressed supremely in his prayer at Opis, Zeno and
the Stoics took their inspiration.
Stoicism could be described as a negative philosophy,
but Heraclitus* observation, "know that all is one and
one is all", indicates its positive political implications.
One such implication was the disregard of national
frontiers. Another was the overlooking of barriers between
classes of men (excepting that between 'wise men and
fools*). Is Stoicism then bound up with the concept of
a world state? Only indirectly. The notion of natural
law, the Stoics' most important contribution to political
theory, does not necessarily have as a corollary the idea
7
of a world political community: this fact can be seen in
much later times. Indeed if the constitution of n world
state is to consist in the law of nature, a law perfect and
hence not to be confused with existing written laws, then
the world state is being regarded, from the beginning, less
as a political fact than as a half-ethereal unity which is
unaffected in character by the political systems that prevail
on earth. Cicero's famous reference to "one eternal and
unchangeable law" which "will be valid for all nations and all
times"7 clearly places natural law in a position indeoendent
of national barriers and, consequently, one in which it is
able to function despite them. These barriers shrink in
importance but are not directly attacked, and in Cicero's
view it may be deemed a fair if unoriginal statement of
Stoic theory the citizen of the world owes an obedience
to the laws of his particular state.
It is true that this obedience must always be conditional,
and here is the only positive sense in which Stoicism, like
most theories of the middle ages too, envisages an unlimited
community.8 It does not oppose the limited community; it
merely applies to it restrictions which could be imposed
equally well on a world-wide political structure, if this
were not regarded as a final and complete expression of the
moral order for which the ius naturals speaks. The Stoic
citizen is a citizen of two states: a view foreshadowing
8
Augustine's. Augustine, like the later stoics, sees before
him the pleasing prospect of the Pax Romans being upheld by
a world-wide empire. But the prospect is not central to his
theory. Much more central is the question, "What does it
matter to man, in this brief mortal life, under whose rule
he lives...?""''
The conclusion we may draw from an examination of early
natural law theories is that they are tied to no particular
size of state: they are not moulded by being designed for
any special sort of community. This continues to be true
even when an admixture of Aristotelian!sn is introduced, as
in Aquinas. In the thirteenth century the earthly state was
acquiring greater respectability in the eyes of philosophers;
perhaps, after all, the good life could only be lived through
the agency of the political community. Aquinas to some extent
fuses Aristotle and Augustine and, If he had kept his eye on
the largest temporal city that was possible, we might have
had a political theory seriously designed, under the limitation
of course of natural law, for a real and organised world
community. But western Europe was disintegrating into distinct
nations, and St. Thomas left it to Dante to produce the idea
of a universal monarchy. Perhaps his own leaning towards
Aristotle had an effect in diverting him from any predilection
for a -world state, though certainly he was concerned with much
larger states than the polis. The whole question was a
9
secondary one for him;10 ho considered that even the most
ideal state would provide insufficient happiness, owing to
the depth of human aspirations.
Dante, for his part, took the obvious enough step of
carrying forward Aristotle's proof that the polls was a
'natural' growth out of the household and the village, by
arguing that in tho same way the universal empire was
superior to the smaller state.11 That his view was not more
widely accepted may be ascribed partly to its apparent
impracticability {e.g. the difficulty of effective control
between distant lands, especially with the opening up of the
'new world* in the late fifteenth century) but as much to
arguments of theory. The mediaeval principle of unity is
not necessarily a centralising influence --- in Gierke's words,
"Political thought when it is genuinely mediaeval starts from
the whole, but ascribes an intrinsic value to every partial
whole down to and including the individual."12 A plurality,
as Marsilio of Padua pointed out, can in this way constitute
a unity; and for this reason Marsilio left open the question
of the political unity of the world. So with other writers.
John of Paris held the opinion that in the Church divine law
demands unity, but that in the secular sphere the faithful
13
should be content to live each within his own state. And
Ockham appears to have thought that sometimes unity and
sometimes severance would be desirable, according to
1 0
circumstances.
In general, mediaeval thought, preoccupied with the
difficulty of relating secular and ecclesiastical authority
a difficulty which could be present in any community, large
or small —- did not seriously attack the problem of the
political community's size. So long as the concept of a
world-wide church retained its force, however, that of a
world-wide temporal power was likely to be heard of at any¬
time when the papacy found itself in conflict with the
various existing temporal powers. In fact, whenever the
wisdom of the 'separation of powers' might be called into
question and the possibility might arise that the problem
could be more satisfactorily dealt with if the temporal powers
were first united into one. It may bo true to say, therefore,
that the unlimited community was never far from the doorstep
of political theory (however far It was from political
practice) until the Reformation.
The development of national churches, in England and
in some principalities of Germany, was only one of the factors
helping to foster unified national states (trade developments,
for example, called for effective central administration, and
the reception of Roman civil law may have spread some
idealisation of the smaller 'sovereign' community), but It
was of the first importance in blotting out any vision of
an unlimited earthly community. For the inspiration of such
a vision had been religious, as we have seen. It was no more
central to the religious thought of the middle ages than it
had been to that of the Stoics, but it was present as a
concomitant cf natural lew theory, however unlikely might
seem its realisation. When the supra-national character of
the church was assaulted, this position changed. Even the
theoretical arguments in favour of an unlimited community
were simultaneously discounted. Figgis may have been too
sweeping in the comment he once made that "In fact, the
religion of the Stat© superseded the religion of the Church"^
or if not too sweeping, too vague. One may better say,
perhaps, that the religion of the national church superseded
that of the world church, and that, the process was accompanied
by an immense strengthening of the state. From this viewpoint
Luther is seen as a more important figure than Machiavelli,
whose supplanting of natural law by 'Reason of State' none
the less puts the keystone on the arch of what is usually
termed national sovereignty.
If anything lingered on of the ideal of a united
Christendom, it was removed at Westphalia in 1648, 135 years
after The Prince's publication. With the end of thirty years
of religious wars the new European political order was
accepted and the nation was now seen as the final human unity
to be aimed at on earth. Bodin had formulated his theories
of sovereignty almost three-quarters of a century earlier;
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and despite his acceptance of natural law it is quite clear
that he envisaged no enforceable law which could restrict the
sovereign power of any given state.
It might not be an exaggeration to say that this
acceptance of the nation as the standard political unit
went almost unchallenged from the seventeenth century to the
twentieth. At all events it held sway through Hooker (In the
late sixteenth century) and Hobbes to Locke, and, equally,
in the time of Rousseau.
It remains to verify, from'the texts of Locke and
Rousseau, that these two writers did in fact envisage a
limited community for the practice of their theories. The
task is simple, for in both cases it is at once clear that
the authors had no unlimited community in mind.
Locke, it Is true, finds a political society where 'any*
number of men "are so united into one society as to quit every
15
one his executive power of the law of nature", and says
that he uses the word commonwealth to refer to 'any*
"independent community which the Latins signified by the
word civitas.But references to "the defence of the
commonwealth from foreign injury"-1-7 and to the employment of
the force of the community "abroed, to prevent or redress
foreign injuries and secure the community from inroads and
invasion" leave no doubt that Locke envisaged a community co-
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existing with others.
Still less is there any doubt in the ease of Rousseau,
whose discussion of the best size for a state is alone enough
(since he hints at no schene for massacring that part of the
world's population which is deemed surplus to his 'best state')
to prove that his theories are designed, as we should expect,
for a limited community co-existing with others. "As nature
has set bounds to the stature of a well-made man, and,
outside those limits, makes nothing but giants or dwarfs,
similarly, for the constitution of a ^tate to be at Its best,
it is possible to fix limits that will make it neither too
large for good government, nor too small for self-maintenance."18
Again, "there is not a single unique and absolute form of
government, but as many governments differing in nature as
there are states differing in size."*-*'
4uite evidently neither writer set out to apply his
ideas to an unlimited community. Whether the ideas would be
so applicable is of course to be discussed. We shall take
Rousseau first, dealing especially with the famous Contrat
Social, complex and germinal, of 1762.
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2. A 'CQLL5CTIVIST1 THEORY: ROUSSEAU
Rousseau's reasons for preferring a limited community.
The structure of the Contrat Social gives a reader
the impression that Rousseau, before working out his main
political theories, satisfied himself as to the type and
size of state with which he had better deal. For the
arguments he puts forward concerning the best size of a
state are not based on those concepts, such as that of
the general will, which form the most important part of
his book. The connection between these major ideas and the
matter of the state's size is in fact one which he hardly
troubles to discuss. But indirectly his arguments as to
the state's size are of interest, if only for the light
they throw on the picture that the word 'state' naturally
created in his mind. It is a picture remote from that
presented by the great industrial states of the twentieth,
or for that matter of the later nineteenth, century.
Rousseau shows little anxiety to avoid a state that
is too small. He declares that a state must not be "too
1 5
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small for self-maintenance" but this is not amplified.
In the same chapter we find the suggestion that "the
reason for expansion, being merely external and relative,
ought to be subordinate to the reasons for contraction,
which are internal and absolute." This reference to the
♦merely external' reasons for expansion is to a state's
need to protect itself against its neighbours; "for all
peoples have a kind of centrifugal force that makes them
continually act one against another...» Thus the weak run
21
the risk of being soon swallowed up." The need for any
other sort of ♦self-maintenance' seems already almost for¬
gotten, and one can only try to guess what Rousseau meant
by it. That the land should be able to provide all the
people's necessities, and that thq people should be numerous
enough to work the land? This point Rousseau deals with
22
separately, recognising that the size of a political body
can be measured by the extent of its territory as well as
by the number of its citizens. The relation between the
two is seen to be one for local adjustment. Rousseau
probably took the reasonable view that a rough decision
might first be taken as to the right number of a state's
inhabitants, and that this decision might be varied to a
limited degree in particular instances.
The need for self-protection against neighbours is
potentially an important argument not only against the tiny
1 6
community, but also against any but a very large one. If
"it is almost impossible for any one (state; to preserve
itself except by putting itself in a condition of equilibrium
23
with all", then the size of a state ought perhaps to be
determined by the size of the largest neighbouring state
beside which it wishes peacefully to exist. But Rousseau
certainly did not hold this opinion. He recognised an
alliance as an alternative to full self-protection. A
people fit for legislation will be one which (among other
qualifications) "without entering into its neighbours'
quarrels, can resist each of them single-handed, or get the
24
help of one to repel another." The last clause would
■***+*L
presumably have been tf.ado elaborated if Rousseau had written
the treatise on the external relations of a state to which
he alludes in the conclusion of the Contrat Social.
Rousseau puts forward, then, no very convincing plea
for the establishment of a minimum size for the state. The
arguments he does use are much more like reluctant admissions
that a tiny state may find it impossible to survive. Nothing
is said to suggest that a very small state, if its physical
survival were possible, would have any incentive to enlarge
its boundaries. It is already fairly clear to us with what
size of state the author's sympathies lie.
Against a state swollen in magnitude, on the other hand,
Rousseau brings the contention that it loses strength. Strength
1 7
of what sort? Cohesion, it seems, and stability. "Every
25
extension of the social tie means its relaxation." This
interpretation of 'strength' may be set with a statement
in the Dedication to Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality: "If I had had to choose the place of my birth,
I should have preferred a society which had an extent
proportionate to the limits of the human faculties; that
26
is, to the possibility of being well governed." In the
Contrat Social, again, Rousseau avers that "A thousand argu¬
ments could be advanced in favour of this principle"
i.e., the principle that the larger the state, the weaker
it will be. Of fcWese thousand arguments he notes, admittedly,
only a fe\*. In the first place, he considers, long distances
make administration more difficult. They also make for a
superimposition of authorities, and this increases admini¬
strative costs. Furthermore there is less cohesion, less
feeling of unity. (Here we are nearest to Rousseau's
essential views.) The people hardly see their rulers, and
so have less affection for them. Different laws lead to
trouble and confusion among the peoples.
It is evident that these points have a tendency to be
merely technical. Their truth will vary in different times
and circumstances. (New influences leap to mind, such as
the effect of aeroplanes in improving administration at a
1 8
distance, and of television in strengthening a people's
contact with its rulers). And however carefully one assessed
their modern importance, one would have made little progress
in evaluating the present-day relevance of the quintessential
Rousseau. He is here putting forward views which are more
or less haphazard, vividly though they show the trend of his
thought upon the right size of a state. He has prepared us
for what is perhaps the most sweeping of all his definitions
of a people 'fit for legislation': "one in which every
27
member may be known by every other." This is the scene
which Rousseau sets for his theories.
The General Will: its nature.
At the centre of Rousseau's political philosophy is
the problem of the so-called general will. The discovery
of this Will, a vastly influential contribution to political
theory, can be credited or debited to Rousseau's name without
cavil. Previous writers (for example of the school of natural
law), however much Rousseau may have derived from them, did
not use the same terminology; and of contemporaries only one
seems to have had any share in the coining of the term:
Diderot, in an Encyclopaedia article of 1755. Writings
subsequent to the Gontrat Social which treat of a general
will may reasonably be regarded as interpretations, develop¬
ments or perversions of Rousseau's theory.
One line of separation appears in the pile of confusion
vjhich landmarks the general will concept amid the political
thought of two hundred years. It is that between the question
whether the will exists, and the question how, if at all,
the will is to be expressed. The division between these two
points seems to have been sharper in the mind of Rousseau
himself than in the minds of some subsequent critics, dome
of them have tended to dismiss as a barren metaphysical
issue the former problexa if they could not first find a
satisfactory answer to the latter one. In actual fact the
possibility of expressing the will, of applying it to
practical affairs, must clearly depend above all on the
nature of the will itself. Before we can set the concept
to earning its maintenance in political theory, we must
see what claims are made for it, what manner of phenomenon
it is. By this means we may also hope to find whether we
are really dealing with the brain-child of some alien muse,
which has jumped into the field of politics across a
boundary from theology or even from poetry, and which might
suitably be returned there.
We can discover very little about Rousseau's conception
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of the general will from his suggestions for its expression.
In practice it comes near to being identified with the
decisions of the majority in a primary assembly, but this
is a dangerous generalisation. Even a unanimous decision
would not necessarily express housseau's general will, as
we shall mention later in discussing the will's implementation.
To discover its nature, then, we are driven back on its
expositor's definitions.
Let us take this one as the key: "Each individual, as
a man, may have a particular will contrary or dissimilar to
2$
the general will which he has as a citizen." This state¬
ment can only mean that no person is to be relied upon as
being an embodiment of the general will freed from entangle¬
ment with any private will. Indeed no single trustworthy
mouthpiece of the will is at all likely to be found, except
for limited periods, among the people. "In reality, if it
is not impossible for a particular will to agree on some
point with the general will, it is at least impossible for
the agreement to be lasting and constant; for the particu¬
lar will tends, by its very nature, to partiality, while
the general will tends to equality. It is even more
impossible to have any guarantee of this agreement; for
even if it should always exist, it would be the effect not
of art, but of chance."2^
2 1
On the other hand it is clear that in Rousseau's view
no one, so long as he remains a participant in the 'original
contract', ceases to share in the general will. Even a man
who "detaches his interest from the common interest" is only-
putting his own particular good in front of his share in the
general good. "Apart from this particular good, he wills
the general good in his own interest, as strongly as any¬
one else.So just as no member of the political community
is to be relied upon as devoid of a particular will, no
member is to be thought of as devoid of the general will.
This qualifies considerably an opinion such as that of Mc-
Dougall, who says Rousseau "seems to mean that a certain
number of men will the general good, while many will only
31
their private goods...." All persons within the social
bond are likely to possess, and to manifest in different
proportions at different times, both sorts of will.
The social bond itself, within which the general will
is manifested, comes into being with the making of the
social compact. If the compact itself did not prove to
be of a rather theoretical nature, this creation would
seem more arbitrary than it does. "The passage from the
state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable
change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his
conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly
22
lacked."32 The state having been instituted, residence
within it is the normal token of allegiance to the contract.33
This is satisfactory enough. But how, if ever, does the
contract become broken so that the general will ceases to
exist? Rousseau speaks of a time "when the state, on the
eve of ruin, maintains only a vain, illusory, and formal
34
existence, when in every heart the social bond is broken,"
but this breaking of the social bond 'in the heart' does not
apparently exterminate the general will; it merely renders
it mute. An individual however may place himself outside
the sphere of the will, if he is the sort of malefactor
who "by attacking social rights, becomes on forfeit a
rebel and a traitor to his country; by violating its laws
he ceases to be a member of it; he even makes war upon
it."35
So much for the location of the will and the conditions
under which it exists. Now its character is fairly obvious:
it aims at the general good. It has therefore much in common
with any other concept of an ideal, supra-personal will,
say with a divine will or a 'best self. Yet for these
terms it is not a synonym, because as defined by Rousseau
it has particular limitations. Anyone who finds it possible
to accept the existence of some ideal will is likely to
find the general will concept plausible in essence; but by
23
coining his own term# Rousseau has provided himself with
the opportunity to make ex cathedra statements about this
will and about the conditions under which it is able to
operate. We have seen that these conditions can be quite
arbitrary: the general will may begin to exist at a precise
moment (when the social compact is made) and may end equally
mechanically {in anyone who violates laws which have been
made under this contract). Such a will is very much under
control. Whatever the size of community Involved, the
general will is tied to a single state in a way in which
the divine will, at least in Christian terms, clearly is
not.
It lends itself consequently to a notion of the state
as a 'patson'. We shall not embark here upon an exploration
of 'will' as such, but the existence of a will does seem to
predicate some v^olition, distinguishable from mere impulse.
There exists an intention; and it is argued by Mayo, for
example, that with an individual person this existence of
intention is the proof of psychological (rather than merely
physical) unity. A comparison can be made with the body that
possesses the general will. "In fact," Mayo suggests, "as in
the case of the individual, there is reason for claiming that
36
the general will 'is' the unity of the state." In other
words a will may be said to produce a person. If the will
2 4
is an ideal one then it seems fair to say that this person
is, at least within his sphere, a divinity. Rousseau's
general will is an ideal one (although that he regarded it
37
as "always right" lias been denied ) and if means can be
found for it to express itself then the state will be
speaking, in its given sphere, with the voice of a god.
The General Mil: its realisation.
Rousseau's political theory is based on the assumption
that his general will can be actu&lised, can be made a
tangible directing force in the state. If the people could
call on the services of Delphi, infallibly to express for
them this ideal common will, the chief ambiguities of
Rousseau's theory would certainly be removed. It would be
evident to all whether the will had on any issue been ex¬
pressed, and whether it was being followed. But this happy
position does not obtain and Rousseau's proposals are of
questionable practicality as they stand and might seem more
so in the unlimited community.
The general will is held to be the sovereign, the
wielder by right of supreme power. The qualification, 'by
right', is important. Of any ordinary state of his own
time Rousseau would probably have said that for practical
purposes it had no sovereign at all; more precisely, that
the only true sovereign was not then exercising his, or its,
function. He would have said this on the ground that the
existing supreme powers were not representing the general
will. Sovereignty resides in the will; an act of
sovereignty is an act of the will. The functions of the
will and of the sovereign are similarly defined. Just as
it is fundamental that the general will "must be general
in its object as well as its essence... it must both come
38
from all and apply to all", so an act of sovereignty is
a convention between the body politic and each of its
members, and "can have no other object than the general
good." Sovereignty is produced by the contract. "The
social compact gives th^body politic absolute power over
all its members... it is this power which, under the
direction of the general will, bears the name of sovereignty.
And "the power indeed may be transmitted, but not the will."^
Sovereignty, then, combines de facto power with right, but
without the former it is merely dormant, whereas without the
latter it does not exist.
In speaking of positive law, Rousseau repeats his main
definition of the general will and of sovereignty. The law
"unites universality of will with universality of object."^
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In a footnote he specifically says that by a republic he
understands generally any government directed by the
general will, "which is the law." In the Discourse on
Political gconomy, the will is "the source" of the laws.
(In another part of the same essay, it is their "source
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and supplement." } A law, then, is an act of the
sovereign, a "public act of the general will."^
It is clear that these definitions simply provide us
with new names to apply to the will whenever it exercises
itself, and to its positive pronouncements. The will must
wield the supreme existing power. We have still to find
how the trick is to be done.
By his definitions of the general will's scope,
Rousseau limits the task he sets himself. Apart from any
limitations that we may (doubtfully) suppose to be imposed
on the will by natural law, the separation of its functions
from those of the legislative is itself a limitation. Just
as the executive is concerned only with particulars, so the
sovereign "does not and cannot exceed the limits of general
conventions"; it "recognises only the body of the nation,
and draws no distinction between those of whom it is made
up.n44 Also, the sovereign "cannot impose upon its sub¬
jects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor
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can it even wish to do so." On this account it cannot,
for example, control religious creeds, except in as much
as they directly affect people's conduct. "As the Sovereign
has no authority in the other world, whatever the lot of
its subjects may be in the life to come, that is not its
business, provided they are good citizens in this life."^
Within these frontiers, how does housseau's general
will operate? It finds expression in a majority vote.
Of this there is no doubt. An equation of the general will
with a majority vote is not, however, to be laid at his door
Such an equation would mean a statement that majority
opinion always and necessarily states the general will.
"There is but one law," ftousseau lays down, "which,
from its nature, needs unanimous consent. This is the
social compact..." And, "Apart from this primitive contract
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the vote of the majority always binds all the rest." This
last statement calls for comment. It does not mean that a
majority vote always expresses the will, for Kousseau is
'presupposing', as he says a little later in the same
chapter, that the qualities of the will still reside in
the majority when the vote is taken. "When they cease to
do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer
possible" — i.e., presumably, the original contract is
dissolved. So either the general will is expressed by the
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majority or it is not to be put into force at ail. And
the fact that a majority vote is clear, even when it is
dealing with matters perfectly proper to the general will,
is not proof that the will is really being expressed. In
the fourth book of the Contrat Social is a reference to
the possibility that even unanimity may simply be the
reflection of servitude.
We are left with the almost ludicrous position that
even when all Rousseau's rules are observed, a citizen is
faced with a majority vote which may perfectly well represent
the general will «— in which case he must obey it, so
realising his own true freedom —- or which may perfectly
well not do so, in which case th^itizen may apparently
do what he likes, for all Jean-Jacques cares, because the
social compact has been broken and neither freedom nor
obligation are now effective for him. The citizen is
given no means of discriminating between the two cases.
On the one hand, the ideal state may be manifesting itself;
on the other, the state may in ail worthwhile senses have
ceased to exist. This is the crucial fallacy of the Gontrat
Social. It is astonishing that some coramentators have
skated round it
It is a flaw that must never be ignored. In discussing
the rest of Rousseau's political views we are always 'pre-
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supposing', after his own manner, that if all his recommend¬
ations are followed and a majority vote taken, it will
express the general will —- or that it will, at least, be
accepted as doing so. Rousseau would have avoided much of
this trouble, and might not have reduced, the practical value
of his arguments, if he had allowed the social compact to
be the direct and explicit foundation of the acceptance of
a majority vote as the voice of the general will. That
he did not do so is probably a measure of his consciousness
that these two, will and majority vote, may diverge. In
the event of such a divergence the contract as he has
defined it is broken. His approach strongly suggests that
ha prefers the dissolution of the compact to any acquiescence
in mass tyranny, even though he cannot tell us how to
determine when such a tyranny has appeared.
The majority vote then is fallible, but is the best
guide available. Such reliability as it does possess is
conditional on the observance of certain rules. Already
we have glanced at those which limit the sovereign's sphere
of authority, but there are also some recommendations by
Rousseau as to the sovereign's manner of working, its means
of expressing itself.
One of these concerns the figure ox the legislator.
Rousseau's legislator really belongs only to a state's early
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phase, when he helps the public to see the good which it
desires. If his function is thought of as that of helping
to ensure that the majority vote represents the general
will, he is not entirely out of place. And this is how
Rousseau sees him. Rousseau is driven to recognise that
the mere making of the social contract will not immediately
produce an ability in the populance always to supplant the
♦will of all' (better termed, perhaps, the wills of all)
by the general will. In the early stages the people must
have guidance. It is clearly stated that the legislator
can never by himself make his proposals law. "There can
be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity
with the general will, until it has been put to the free
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vote of the people." This having been said, we need not
worry much over the legislator.
Another proviso is that pressure groups must not be
active, if the general will is to be accurately expressed.
If a citizen sees that such groups are in fact at work,
he may be reasonably sure (one supposes) that the general
will is not being voiced. But it would be quite wrong to
suppose that the absence of pressure groups is itself
enough to make the will's expression secure; here again,
the guidance is merely negative.
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The most important of kousseau's recommendations con¬
cerns the ascertaining of majority opinion. "The Sovereign
cannot act save when the people is assembled." Then: "The
people in assembly, I shall be told, is a mere chimera. It
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is so today...." But in calling it a chimera kousseau
does not deem such an assembly unthinkable; merely unthought
of. For he insists on a primary assembly where it is at all
practicable. "It is useless to bring up abuses that belong
to great States against one who desires to see only small
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ones." His one concession to "the union of several
towns in a single city" is that the seat of government
may be allowed, in such a case, to shift from town to town.
The concession is a considerable one, because at any given
assembly the bulk of the nation is then, in fact, being
represented; whereas kousseau lays down elsewhere that
"Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable,
cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general
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will...." —- and the will, as we have seen, may be known
to individuals but is to be put into action only by majorities.
Of all points of kousseau's political theory this one
has the plainest practical significance. In a large modern
state its importance grows, since an assembly of the whole
people is out of the question; in an unlimited community
it would be a more fundamental point still, kousseau
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certainly prefers that majority opinion, which proclaims
the general will, should be proclaimed by a primary assembly.
But how far does the impossibility of this in a large state
invalidate his theories, and if he himself does not think
it invalidates them, by what alternative means does he
allow the sovereign to govern?
A loophole is offered at first sight by the suggestion
of dictatorship. But iiousseau in no way envisages that his
dictator shall represent the sovereign. "He can do anything,
except make laws." The sovereign authority is only suspended,
and "However this important trust be conferred, it is
important that its duration should be fixed at a very brief
period, incapable of being ever prolonged."^
a more attractive way of escape from primary assemblies
seems to be offered by this surprising passage in the
Discourse on Political economy. "But how, I shall be asked,
can the general will be known in cases in which it has not
expressed itself? Must the whole nation be assembled to¬
gether at every unforeseen event? Certainly not." (I) "It
ought the less to be assembled, because it is by no means
certain that its decision would be the expression of the
general will; besides, the method would be impracticable
in a great people, ancps hardly ever necessary where the
government is well-intentioned: for the rulers well know
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that the general will is always on the side which is most
favourable to the public interest, that is to say, most
equitable; so that it is needful only to act justly, to
be certain of following the general will."^ Here, on the
face of it, is a firm contradiction of one of the most
important recommendations of the Contrat oocial. It is
possible to dismiss it on the ground of its context; Kousseau
is speaking of "an infinity of details of administration and
economy," He does not say that radical changes in the law
can be made by rulers in this way. No doubt he envisages a
state where few such changes will be needed. Still, the
comment that frequent assembly of the populance would be
"impracticable in a great people" does cause one to wonder
how important must be the business in hand before it is the
duty of the rulers to seek the public's own view as to its
interests, regardless of the difficulties of assembly.
Rousseau's most explicit treatment of the problem
comes in his Considerations on the Government of Poland
(1772). Here he is forced to come to grips with it, since
he is of course dealing with a specific country, and not
with an ideal state. One important point in his advice to
the Poles concerns federation: he recommends that power
should be divided as much as possible among the thirty-three
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palatinates. But this does not satisfy him; it cannot
satisfy him, since Poland wishes to be essentially one
nation, not thirty-three. He therefore plainly advocates
the representation of the sovereign, the very possibility
of which is, in the Contrat Social, denied. "One of the
greatest disadvantages of large states, the one which above
all makes liberty most difficult to preserve in them, is
that the legislative power cannot manifest itself directly,
and can act only by delegation. This has its good and its
evil side; but the evil outweighs the good. A legislature
made up of the whole citizen body is impossible to corrupt,
but easy to deceive. Representatives of the people are
hard to deceive, but easy to corrupt; and it rarely happens
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that they are not so corrupted." Rousseau follows up with
two means of preventing this "terrible evil of corruption."
The first is that the Diets should meet often, the
representatives changing frequently also. The second is
that representatives should be required to follow their
instructions precisely, and to give to their constituents
a strict account of their conduct in the Diet.
Here beyond doubt is a considerable emendation of the
principles of the Contrat Docial, lending point to Rousseau*s
own remark that the latter book should be re-written. As
Vaughan says, "A new Com,rat Social, a Contrat Aoelal revised
in the light of the Gouvernement de Pologne. would have
been one of the most curious and instructive books on record."
Lacking such an amalgamation, how far is it useful to attempt
to piece together Rousseau's later arguments with the older
and more idealistic ones? In the Government of Poland the
ideal state, wherever it seems impracticable, is cast aside;
Rousseau accepts the position that in Poland the sovereign
cannot express itself directly and must therefore express
itself at secondhand. There is nothing here of the rather
abstract argument of the Contrat docial that "the Sovereign,
who is no less than a collective being, cannot be represented
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except by himself."
The Government of Poland, shows, at least, that Rousseau
believed his general will theory to be adaptable to a state
much larger than his ideal one. It is doubtful whether
the adaptation is consistent with the original proposals.
But at least it is uousseau's own, and in the face of it
we cannot easily say that the general will concept is
applicable only to city-states; nor complain that we
lack suggestions, from the master himself, to help us
towards the application of the general will theory to the
largest state of all.
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The machinery of government.
The position to which Rousseau assigns the government
in his ideal state is clear. It is "an intermediate ooay
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set up between the subjects and the sovereign"; it bears
the name 'prince', or 'magistrate'; its members are
'magistrates', 'kings', 'governors'. Of its powers: "It
is simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which
the rulers, mere officials of the sovereign, exercise in
their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries."
The sovereign "can limit, modify, or recover at pleasure"
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this power. y The setting-up of the government thus implies
no contract between it and the sovereign.
Rousseau comments that "There has been at all times
much dispute concerning the best form of government, without
consideration of the fact that each is in some cases the best,
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and in others the worst." This is rather reminiscent of
Fope:
'For forms of government let fools contest —-
Whate'er is best administered, is best®,
but of course government, whatever form it takes, must be
strictly subordinated in Rousseau's view to the sovereign.
All forms of government, he reminds us, do not suit all
countries. The size, wealth, population and climate of a
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state are all important factors to be considered. "The
question *ihat absolutely is the best government?1 is
unanswerable as well as indeterminate; or rather, there
are as many good answers as there are possible combinations
in the absolute and relative situations of all nations."^
How then decide the best form of government in a given case?
Rousseau sees quite a simple practical test. "The rest
being equal, the government under which, without external
aids, without naturalisation or colonies, the citizens
increase and multiply most is without question the best.
The government under which a people wanes and diminishes
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is the worst." Rousseau is offering here a test of
whether a country is being well governed. It is not
intended to be an aid to the setting up of a good govern¬
ment in the first place. It is a standard of success or
failure for use in a system of trial and error. The Geneva
censorship made a criticism of the Contrat Social here that
would remain relevant in a community of any sort or size:
"... The laws that constitute any government seem to him
to be always revocable, and he does not .see any reciprocal
obligation between those who govern and those who are
governed; the former seem to him only instruments that the
people can always change or crush at will.... He considers
all forms of government to be only provisional, experiments
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that can always be changed...."
'Experiments that can always be changed•' But housseau
does give a good deal of advice on the suitability of
different governments for different states. Let us lay
before him, in this regard, the problem of the unlimited
community. He will sink back in horror, for here is the
most monstrous civil society that men can devise —- "if
we wish to make such a union, we should not expect to avoid
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its natural disadvantages." r But some indirect recommendations
as to its best form of executive may be gleaned.
Democracy seems the least suitable system. On Rousseau's
interpretation it involves the frequent assembly of the whole
people to debate the state's affairs. If the world's
population remains of a size even remotely comparable to its
size at the moment, we may be bold enough to rule such a
scheme out. Even radio and other aids hardly make practic¬
able an organised discussion between all the peoples of the
v/orld. Housseau himself acknowledges that the chief require¬
ment for democracy is "a very small state, where the people
can readily be got together and where each citizen can with
ease know all the rest."^ This last condition, indeed,
threatens to become at least metaphorically feasible —
if we accept the principle that a man who is familiar with
39
a pea is familiar with the contents of all the world's
pods but the constant meeting of the people is
impossible. Disappointment would be misplaced, if it is
true that of all governments a democracy in this sense is
the most subject to civil wars and the most likely to
develop into another form. "So perfect a government is
not for men"; furthermore, "there never has been a real
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democracy, and there never will be" —- because of the
practical difficulties.
Unfortunately, however, Rousseau finds if necessary
that the people should in any case turn itself into a
democracy for at least a few moments in order to nominate
the members of another form of government. Acting as the
sovereign it cannot nominate governors, since this would
be a 'particular' act; hence it must decide on the type
of government it wants and then temporarily become the
government itself for the purpose of elections. Here is a
fresh difficulty for the unlimited community. Not only
have all the people to assemble (1) as primitive individuals
in order to make a contract and become sovereign, and (2)
as the sovereign in order to decide on a form of government;
they have also to assemble (3) at least once as the government.
The first of these meetings may be treated, if we will, as a
fiction. The second is concerned with the expression of the
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general will, and the difficulties inherent in this we
have already seen. If it is accepted that the general will
may in some way or other be expressed in a large community
for example by representation, or by mass meetings in
different cities in succession, these cities being perhaps
selected by lot then the same means my be useful also
in relation to the third problem, the people's single meeting
as a democracy. If the one problem is met, so may the other
be (though one does not imagine that the resulting substitute
for democracy would be accepted by Rousseau as a permanent
form of government). Possibly, again, a paper vote might be
used instead of this single meeting. Otherwise, whatever
form of government is chosen, the nomination of its members
presents in a large community a serious obstacle, additional
to that of achieving any meeting of the sovereign.
The choice of government for the unlimited community
seems to lie between aristocracy and monarchy. From many
of Rousseau's remarks we might take monarchy to be almost
certainly his best government for a very large state. Ke
contends, fairly enough, that a government with few members
is likely to be prompter and more forceful than one with
many members. This is an assertion that will stand without
its supporting arguments, though these are interesting.
Rousseau bases them on a comparison of the strength of different
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combinations of the general will, the individual will, and
the 'corporate' will, the latter being the will of members
of the government, which is itself a'moral person'. The
general will is always the weakest of all; the individual
will is the strongest. In a monarchy the individual and
corporate wills, the two strongest, are united. The
government is therefore strong, though it embodies the
general will only slightly and its rectitude may consequently
be slight also. Separately, Rousseau implies that a larger
government expends more force on its own members.^ Perhaps
this is another way of making the same point, nousseau also
contends that in a large community a strong government is
particularly needed, His theory here is that the particular
wills come to have less relation to the general will; morals
and manners are less likely to conform automatically with
the trend of the laws. This seems debatable. Rousseau says
he is "well aware that moral quantities do not allow of
geometrical accuracy", but is he? The question how many
of a state's citizens individually follow the general will
might be determined less by the state's size than by, say,
its pitch of civilisation. However, Rousseau's two
principles that a big community needs a strong govern¬
ment, and that a small government is the most likely to be
strong seems plausible. From them, "it follows that the
relation of the magistrates to the government should vary
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inversely to the relation of the subjects to the sovereign;
that is to say, the larger the state, the more should the
government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers
diminishes in proportion to the increase in that of the
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people". So, though remembering "the innumerable circum¬
stances which may furnish exceptions", we can so far conclude
that in Rousseau's view the best government for a great state
is a monarchy.
Yet while "monarchy is suitable only for great states",70
Rousseau remains uncertain that it is suitable for any state
at all. For "if it is hard for a great state to be well
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governed, it is much harder for it to be so by a single man."
If the king were all that he might be, Jttousseau would have no
objections. The force of monarchy would then be fully in¬
spired by the general will. But he regards it as "wanton
self-deception to confuse royal government with government
by a good king." The king-by-nature, if we accept Plato's
word, is a rarity, and royal education is in Rousseau's view
likely to corrupt those who receive it. Other defects of
royal government include a tendency on the part of kings
primarily to desire a weak people, so as to preserve their
authority. (Rousseau is perhaps slipping away from his ideal
state here; after all, on his view, the people as sovereign
have conferred on the king his authority and may at any time
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withdraw it.) Kings are liable to appoint intriguers, rather
than able men, to fill subordinate executive posts. There is
a want of continuous succession — or if there isn't, then
"apparent tranquillity has been preferred to wise administration"
by the adoption of an hereditary system. Rousseau further
brings against monarchy the charge of a probable reversal
of policy each time the identity of the king changes, and
also says that ideally a kingdom ought, on every such
occasion, to expand or contract: so as to be suited to the
new ruler's capabilities. This, at least, would not be
feasible in the unlimited community! But it would be diffi¬
cult in any case. The precise extent of the new ruler's
capabilities might be far from obvious.
Of nousseau's three sorts of aristocracy we can dismiss
the 'natural' kind, which is "only for simple peoples", and
presumably the hereditary kind, which he calls "the worst
of all governments." The elective type is by contrast the
best form of government "and is aristocracy properly so
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called." (A true statement, if the electors always elect
the excellent, as Rousseau seems to suppose they will do.)
Plainly it is & form which imposes periodically the problem
of election, which we have already noticed. Except for ideal
democracies Rousseau does not favour election by lot. Perhaps
a paper vote would be admissible. If, however, elections
have to be avoided {on practical grounds), it seems a fair
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conclusion that the form of government Rousseau would recommend
for the unlimited community is not aristocracy but an here¬
ditary monarchy (controlled, as always, by the general will).
For he finds this the best form of government when an here¬
ditary system is necessary. In practice simple governments
are in any case rare, and intermediate officers are needed.
A monarchical government is automatically preserved
from one of the two forms of degeneracy of government that
Rousseau cites: contraction, the transition from the many
to the few. (It is odd, seeing that Rousseau is no in¬
flexible advocate of government by a large number, that he
should term this process 'degeneracy' at all.) What of the
more important type of degeneracy, the breaking of the social
contract through the usurpation of sovereignty by the govern¬
ment (as 'despot') or alternatively the usurpation of
government by one or more of its members (as 'tyrants')?
As an aid to the prevention of this Rousseau acceptably
suggests that "the stronger the government the more often
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should the sovereign show itself."'^ In his theories it is,
and deserves to be, a cardinal point that "there must be
fixed periodical assemblies which cannot be abrogated or pro¬
rogued."^ How otherwise can government be kept in check by
the sovereign? The sovereign, the legislative authority, is
the heart of the state, and on it Rousseau believes that the
continued life of the body politic depends. Once more we
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may fall back on a proposal for assemblies in different
cities in succession, out it is not a very happy one.
To an unlimited community Rousseau's executive machinery
is, in short, perfectly applicable. He would, recommend, in
all probability, an hereditary monarchy or an elective
aristocracy. But with these forms of government the need
for supervision of the government by an active 'sovereign'
is particularly great.
Rousseau and confederation.
One subject of Rousseau's writings might seem to suggest
that his thought was not, after all, wholly focussed on the
limited community. He gives considerable attention to con¬
federations. The Comte dfAntraigues claimed the distinction
of having destroyed a work by Rousseau on Federation extending
to sixteen chapters. Whether or not this was true, Rousseau's
views can be found from his 'edition' of the Abbe de St.
Pierre's Project for Lasting Peace.^ of which edition
Rousseau was, as the publisher suggested, 'in very many
respects the creator.' There is also a passage in hrnile
part of which reads: "We shall examine finally the kind of
remedy that men have sought against these evils in Leagues
and Federations, which, leaving each state master in its own
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house, arm it against all unjust aggression from without.
We shall enquire what are the means of establishing a good
form of federal association, what can give it permanence,
and how far we can extend the rights of the federation without
trenching on those of sovereignty.'1"''^
The last clause is all-important. It shows that what¬
ever his terminology, Rousseau1s initial aim is not federation
(in its modern sense) but confederation. And this, as Vaughan
points out, is what we should expect from one who places his
political hopes on the maintenance of small states. It is
true that even this approach, even the concept of federation
as a useful alliance for the protection of the individual
state in which one is really interested, leads necessarily
to some concern for all the other communities involved. And
we pointed out in the introductory note on terminology that
one reason for preferring the word 'community' to the word
'state ' is that it holds no particular implication as to the
possession of sovereignty by the body referred to. So
Rousseau, in opening the question of confederation, is in
some sense dealing with a larger community, whatever may be
his plans for the retention or alienation of sovereignty on
the part of the federating states. But if these states keep
so much sovereignty that they remain 'politically distinct',
essentially autonomous, then for practical purposes we may




It is bound by it, in any case, in another way too.
Rousseau's edition of the Project for Lasting Peace shows
that he is not envisaging that the federation shall spread
over the world. Be regards the unity of Asia and Africa as
only nominal, whereas Europe is "a real society which has its
religion, its manners, its customs and even its laws, from
which none of the people who compose it can withdraw without
at once causing trouble."77 it is with Europe only that
Rousseau is concerned, although "This concert of Europe has
not always existed", and no doubt the possibility is open
that a similar society could arise on a wider scale. It
arose in Europe, he reminds us, largely through the unifying
influences first of Rome and later of Christianity.
Examining Rousseau's view of "how the free and voluntary
fellowship which unites the European states, by assuming the
strength and stability of a true political body, can be
changed into a real confederation",7^ we may wonder whether
his aim of not trenching on sovereignty was successful. It
is necessary, he says, that "the confederation should be so
general that no considerable power would refuse to join it;
that it should Lave a judicial tribunal with power to establish
laws and regulations binding on all its members; that it
should have an enforcing and coercive power to constrain each
state to submit to common counsels, whether for action or for
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abstention."79
Five points are put forward for the establishment of
this confederation, and these five articles are not to be
altered without the unanimous consent of the confederating
states. The first and second concern the establishment of
a perpetual and irrevocable alliance; the sovereigns partici¬
pating in it are to name plenipotentiaries to a Diet and will
decide the order, time and manner in which the presidency of
the confederation shall pass from one sovereign to another.
The later articles are more interesting for us, since they
affect the sovereignty of the contracting powers. By article
three, "the confederation shall guarantee to its members the
possession and government of all the states each of them
controls at the moment, as well as the succession, elective
or hereditary, according to whichever is established by the
fundamental laws of each countryWell and good. But
the fourth article specifies a case when the confederation
must take active steps, not only against any threat from
outside, but against any of its own members who "shall have
refused to execute the decisions of the grand alliance."
And by the fifth article it is provided that such decisions
can always be made when the plenipotentiaries deem them ad¬
vantageous for the member-countries of the 'Commonwealth of
Europe'.
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Obviously these latter provisions are necessary to the
confederation, and equally obviously they do something to
diminish the extent to which a country controls its own
affairs. A tariff dispute, say, might previously have led
to war between two countries, but now becomes a matter for
arbitration. In effect, the international authority is then
exercising some control over the internal economic policies
of its members. There is no doubt that Rousseau seeks con¬
federation as a means of securing the safety of his small,
ideal state, but especially in present times it is
unlikely that even confederation, as distinct from a
federation, could quite avoid encroaching on sovereignty.
Any such league aims above all at reducing the risk of war
between the contracting parties, and to achieve this end it
must have, as Rousseau recognised, (1) force superior to
that of any one member state, and (2) discretion as to when
It uses this force, even if its scope here is limited by some
original agreement which can only be changed by unanimous
consent. At the least, disputes between ®ember-states must
be settled by arbitration, and unless one country's conduct
of its own affairs can be prevented from having any impact
on other countries, these disputes and their settlementwill
deal with matters which Rousseau would no doubt prefer to
have dealt with by each separate sovereign. In other words,
confederation will shade into federation.
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At federation housseau was not aiming when he edited
the Abbe de St. Pierre's Project. This we have seen. For
his attitude to true federation one must refer (as C.J.
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Friedrich, writing very reasonably on this subject, does not )
to the Government of Poland. The Polish federation was to be
a small one. Although Kousseau was driven to sanction the
representation of the sovereign, therefore, he could console
himself by reflecting that this representation might at least
be direct. In a federation of Europe, on the other hand, the
representation of each separate sovereign in the Diet would
more probably be at second or third hand.
It is noteworthy that in the Government of Poland housseau
was not alarmed at the possibility that the central Diet might
entrench on the sovereignty of the palatinates. Indeed he was
anxious that they should be subordinated to it. Why this
difference in approach? One reason, surely, is that housseau
was avowedly producing a scheme for Poland, not for one or
other of the palatinates. He could hardly begin by throwing
aside the unity of the nation towards whose corporate improve¬
ment his plans were directed. But probably there is another
explanation. He was able to accept Poland as possessing a
general will; he did not see Europe, despite its being a
"real society", in the same light.
We are left with this position. In neither the Project
for Lasting Peace nor the Government of Poland does Housseau
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depart from his preference for a limited community. But the
one work shows that, to preserve peace, he would venture on
methods tending towards federation; the second shows once
more that, where circumstances compel him to direct his
attention to a multi-state community and where he accepts
this larger community as having a general will, full federation
does not seem to him to be incompatible with the rest of his
political theory. This despite the fact that the sovereign
must then act by representation.
The general will of the world.
We have now seen (both in speaking of the general will's
realisation and of Rousseau's attitude to federation) that
Rousseau points a way towards the implementation of the
general will in any size of community, provided he thinks
that in that community the will potentially exists. And we
have seen (in speaking of the machinery of government) that
if the sovereign is once realised in a large community, no
serious problems will be posed by the adaptation of itousseau's
executive.
Would Rousseau agree that there can be a general will
of the world?^
It is a common interest which makes the general will, and
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Rousseau does not seem to insist on a common culture. He
\
would not necessarily have agreed with Bosanquet's view-
that "Mo such identical experience can be presupposed in
all mankind as is necessary to effective membership of a
common society and exercise of a general will."^ And even
•*
were this Rousseau's own view, it remains a questionable
one, as has been interestingly pointed out in a thesis by
Rigg. Writers on internationalism commonly use the tern
♦general will' in two senses: the first, as representing
a belief that human desires, truly understood, are non-
contradictory; the second, as representing the idea of a
common culture which is also a peculiar one. Rigg acceptably
argues that "According to the first conception, it is necessary
for a general will that human desires be non-contradictoryj
according to the second, they must be in large measure
identical." Holders of the second view have a case for ob¬
jecting to a world federation, provided they can believe that
such human wishes as are identical e.g. the wish for
survival are not the predominant desires.
One can only guess at the position which might now have
been taken up on this by Rousseau. It is at least possible
that he would have held (1) that the present world situation
demands the establishment of a federation embracing all
countries, if only for the sake of safety; (2) that now, if
not before, there exist the ingredients of a world-wide general
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will; and (3) that in consequence a confederation must be
set up, and merged into federation in so far as the new
general will can find practical means of expression on such
an unprecedentedly large scale. These means would probably
be concerned with representation (always assuming that we
discount the passage in the Political economy, already referred
to, which says that rulers need only act justly to be sure of
following the general will.)
If this were Rousseau's position when confronted with the
present world situation and it seems fair to suppose that
it would be, unless he reiterated, in despair, his comment on
Geneva in Letters from the Mountain*^ it would involve,
as the Government of Poland dia, and this time much more
drastically, the denial of his own doctrine that the sovereign
cannot be represented. It was perhaps fear of this that
helped to dissuade him from proposing a federation, rather
than confederation, of Europe; despite the fact that he ad¬
mitted Europe to be "a real societyu and so, one would have
thought, a society with the makings of a general will. (If
this was one of his object1^ to full European federation, it
was probably not the only one. Rousseau thought that there
was a natural condition of equilibrium among European states
which would in any case always prevent the establishment of
a 'universal* European monarchy, under which head we may
perhaps include any sort of complete federation.)
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Still, to have forebodings as to the way the general
will must find expression in a large state is, as we have
said, not the same as to say that it cannot be expressed at
all. Still less is it to say that in a large community a
general will cannot even exist. One could plausibly argue
that the universal need for peace, as an alternative to
possible extermination, is by itself enough of a common
interest to bring into being a general will of the world.
Rousseau and the individual
Vie come to the conclusion that Rousseau* s political
writings may, on his own showing, be applied to the unlimited
community. On the other hand, their practical utility
and even meaning becomes steadily more dubious as they are
related to larger states than the city-state he had in mind.
It is time to turn to the practical effect of his theories,
in any size of state, upon the individual citizen: the man
who is born free, but is even now not out of sight of his
chains•
In the perennial discussion whether Rousseau's theories
are individualist or collectivist, there have been some un¬
necessary confusions. Rousseau could well have been mainly
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individualist in intention without his theories being so in
their effect. Also, it is arguable that there is more than
one way of being an individualist: that individualism need
not mean liberalism.
Although a writer's intentions when starting a project
should not be appealed to with a view to misrepresenting his
actual achievement, it joay be useful to bear his intentions
in mind. And this is one sphere in which it is fair to take
into account, if enough accurate information is to hand,
the character and circumstances and outlook of the man himself.
Where Rousseau is concerned there is plenty of data; almost
too much of it. Those who favour the biographical approach
to ideas it is seldom unpopular have every facility
for replacing an analysis of Rousseau's writings by a strong
picture of Rousseau himself, from which his ideas can be
confidently if wrongly deduced. If, as a critic has said,
Rousseau was rather like the crystal ball that reflects what¬
ever is around it, it is equally true that writers of all
kinds have come up to the crystal, seen what was mirrored
there, and gone away to delineate not so much Rousseau's mind
as their own.
Still, in the words of F.M. Watkins, Rousseau's personal
experience "goes far to explain the direction of his political
thought." {Just as Professor Watkins' own extraordinary en¬
vironment, mid-twentieth-century America, may go some way to
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explain the direction of his summary of Rousseau's experience)
Rousseau's life is generally agreed to have been in some ways
a frustrating one. For whatever reasons, he felt himself
less and less at one with society, as is seen in the Confessions
and most explicitly in that work's sequel, the Reveries of a
Solitary. It is customary to say that in the last stages of
his life he suffered, if not from madness, from a 'persecutional
mania'. The evidence rather suggests that what he mainly
suffered from was not persecutional mania but exactly what
he thought he suffered from, i.e. persecution; but that is by
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the way. F.C, Green, in his recent study of the life and
writings of Rousseau, has something of the traditional pre¬
occupation with delusions and illusions, but he admits that
these were "terribly real to Jean-Jacques". He comments:
"Viewed in perspective, the Reveries illuminate the final
phase of Rousseau's life-long struggle to preserve the
integrity of his fundamental self in an age dedicated to the
cult of material progress, the 'new doctrine' which might
ultimately destroy mankind by eliminating what is specifically
go
natural and human in the individual."
We should not expect a man in this sort of position to
worship society as he knew it. In his political theorising
he might seek a means of removing all restraint from the in¬
dividual, or he might alternatively seek a new sort of society
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which would achieve much the same end by expressing each in¬
dividual's true individuality .for him. It was this latter
solution, rather a magical one certainly, that Rousseau
favoured.
Rousseau believed that his work was of a piece, and
in the present century critics have come to admit tnat the
Gontrat Social, in intention at least, is not unrelated to
the individualist attitude he displays elsewhere. Whatever
the value of Rousseau's prescription for social man, the
diagnosis which inspires his suggestions is penetrating and
unambiguous, and is maintained consistently in his writings.
In the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences {the successful
prize essay by which the Academy of Dijon has made its lasting
name) Rousseau plunges almost at once into his attack upon
conformity. "In our day... there prevails in modern manners
a servile and deceptive conformity; so that one would think
every mind had been cast in the same mould.""^ Whom, signifi¬
cantly, does this recall? It brings to mind Tocqueville,
writing on America in 1635: "It seems, at first sight, as if
all the minds of the Americans were formed upon one model,
so accurately do they correspond in their manner of judging.
Rousseau the supposed revolutionary and Tocqueville an often-
supposed reactionary shake hands across 1769* We might invite
J.S. Mill to make up an interesting trio: "Thus the mind it¬
self is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do for pleasure,
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conformity is the first thing thought of... they become
incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are
generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth,
Q1
or properly their own."'
Rousseau the individualist continues in the same essay:
"We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a
perpetual restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which
we call society, all act under the same circumstances exactly
alike, unless very particular and powerful motives prevent
go
them." It may be objected to these quotations from the
Discourse on the Arts and Sciences that Rousseau himself, in
the Confessions, expressed a rather low opinion of that essay.
But in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, five years
later, Rousseau is putting forward the same view of social
man: he "lives constantly outside himself, and only knows
how to live in the opinion of others...." And, "always
asking others what we are, and never daring to ask ourselves,
in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, and civilisation,
and of such sublime codes of morality, we have nothing to show
for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance,
honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure
without happiness.
Three years later again, we find in the Letter to
dfAlembert: "If in solitude our habits arise from our own
wishes, in society they are born of the opinion of others.
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When one lives not by oneself but among others, it is their
judgements that rule everything; nothing appears good or
desirable to individuals other than what the public has judged
so, and the only happiness known by most people is that of
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being thought happy.(Rousseau may have reflected in passing
that society's peculiar notion of happiness is paralleled by an
equally irrational one of misery; he makes some allusion to
this in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.95)
Once more, in the third dialogue of Rousseau Ju;-,e de
Jean-Jacques: "Everywhere only a varnish of words; all men
seek their happiness in appearance. No one cares for reality,
everyone stakes his essence on illusion. Slaves and dupes
of their self-love, men live not in order to live but to make
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others believe that they have livedI"
In the face of passages like these the undesirability
of dismissing Rousseau as a eolleetivist is fairly clear.
Qualifications must be added to any judgement of tkle kind.
And, in fact, many critics have added them, Vaughan is
commonly pointed to as one who has too much simplified the
issue, but there are contradictions in Vaughan. At the out¬
set of his work he says: "Strike out the Dlscours sur
1'inegalitd with the first few pages of the Contrat social,
and the 'individualism' of Rousseau will be seen to be nothing
better than a myth."97 Elsewhere, however, he refers to
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Rousseau as a passionate pleader for the cause of individual
freedom.The way to avoid this dichotomy is to recognise
in the first place, as we have suggested, a probable difference
between Rousseau's intentions and his achievements.
L^on Buguit, in 1917, made this distinction admirably.
His verdict is: "J.-J. Rousseau is the father of Jacobin
despotism, of Caesarian dictatorship, and, upon closer ob¬
servation, tne inspirer of the doctrines of absolutism of
Kane and of Hegel." Shortly afterwards: "That Rousseau is
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a convinced individualist we cannot deny."
The truth contained in both these statements has slowly
become recognised (though Ouguit's paper itself seems to
have attracted little attention, except from Berathe) and a
succession of attempts has been made in the present century
to explain the exact peculiarities of this individualism
that produces collectivism. Gay, in an introduction to his
translation of Cassirer's The question of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, is able to name some of the best-known modern
critics of Rousseau —- Hendel, Cobban, Derathe —- as being
inn
in the tradition of Gustave Lanson, E.H. Wright, and Cassirer.
They have this in common, that they recognise an attempted
unity in Rousseau's work.
Traditionally the rights and duties of the individual
were proclaimed and defended by the doctrine of natural law.
But Rousseau, however much he was influenced by natural law
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theories, departed from them. He did not seem convinced
that he had done so. Consequently the relationship of his
ideas to natural law can appear quite complicated if it is
studied in isolation from the whole picture of his ideal
state: a state, we must remember, in which the sovereign
represents an all-righteous will limited only (1) by not
being supposed to deal with particular issues, and (2) by
Rousseau's own ex cathedra statements as to the will's in¬
ability to be unreasonable or inequitable.
The important recent work of Derath6 has dealt with this
matter at some length. Derathe holds that most of Rousseau's
interpreters have gone astray in dealing with his central
paradox: the paradox that his sovereign "thus presents this
double character of being at the same time absolute and
limited."^"^1 But is it much of a paradox? Is not the apparent
contradiction the result of a confusion between fact (as
represented by Rousseau's concrete proposals) and ideal (as
represented by Rousseau's hopes}? Rousseau's sovereign is
in fact absolute, whatever limiting characteristics he may
wishfully assign to it. (I am ignoring here the distinction,
mentioned by Derating quoting Burlamaqui, between 'absolute'
and 'unlimited'.)
By traditional theories of natural lav/ each individual
is the ultimate judge of whether or not he should obey
political authority. In this way limits are set to a sovereign's
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understood rights: limits which may be vague but are of
practical importance, because they are applied from outside.
They are not left to be determined only by the innate wisdom
of the sovereign power itself. Everything about Rousseau's
schemes that we have so far considered suggests that he
allows none of these practical limits to the sovereign1s
authority. If, however, it can be shown that despite
appearances to the contrary he is ready to subordinate his
concept of the general will to that of natural law, the
Rousseauist state will be no less sympathetic to individual
consciences than the Lockeiari one. Is it possible that
Rousseau is ready to do this?
Vaughan, himself not hypnotised by the merits of natural
law theory, claimed that Rousseau "sweeps away the idea of
1 H2
natural law, root and branch."J-w* He points to its absence
from the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and to its
explicit rejection in the first draft of the Contrat Social.
A number of other critics (e.g. Gough,^^ and Cobban before
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he was moved by Derathe to a revision of his views ) have
given the same verdict. It seems basically a sound one. It
can be challenged, however, on several grounds.
One ground is that Rousseau was familiar with the idea
of natural law from previous political theories, as of course
he was, and that he took over some natural law terminology:
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as in speaking of his sovereign as a 'moral person'. This
line of argument proves nothing. An examination of liousseau's
authorities, if such they can be called, does not help us
unless it clarifies what Rousseau said. Cobban thinks that,
IDS
as expounded by Derathe, it has done so. ^ Derathd's
historical foraging may certainly have savedhim from an over-
rigorous diet of Rousseau, and so have encouraged a fresh
approach. But Rousseau's theories remain what they were.
Another ground is Rousseau's view of the social contract.
How could the contract be effective, it is asked, if moral
obligation was not already understood when it was drawn up?
We sziall answer that it could riot be, and that Rousseau was
therefore inconsistent. Life in the community which had made
Rousseau's compact might certainly encourage the recognition
of moral laws which existed only in embryo in the state of
nature, and which, after the compact, came to be expressed
by the general will. But these mora1 laws would surely have
to be evident already, to some extent, before the contract
became possible. In the first draft of the Contrat Social
Rousseau enunciated that it is from the state that our first
1
distinct notions of justice and injustice are drawn.
Perhaps the word 'distinct' here can be manipulated to mask
the inconsistency. At least it seems wiser to conclude that
Rousseau was inconsistent over the original coxitract than to
deduce, from his presentation of the contract as historical,
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that he was a natural law theorist.
A third arid the most obvious ground for disputing that
Rousseau rejected natural law is provided by his own occasional
allusions to it. Franz Haymarm, in his article on the subject,
draws attention to a number of explicit references, but it is
not always clear that they mean much. Haymarm relies for
support particularly on this remark in Letter VI of Letters
from the Mountain (1764): "... it is no more permitted to
infringe natural laws by the social contract, than it is
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permitted to infringe positive law3 by particular contracts..2.
Whether we are to regard this pronouncement as significant
would seem to depend on what we think Rousseau meant by
'permitted*. If he meant merely that the general will, the
product of the social contract, 'cannot* do wrong, he has
said as much in the Oontrat Social. There does exist, however,
a more surprising passage in which Rousseau says that three
authorities are superior to the sovereign: God, natural law,
and the authority that the idea of honour has over honest
men. The sovereign, if it is ever in conflict with these,
must submit to them. One cannot do better than repeat what
Cobban (in 1934} said of this: "The effect is to concede
practically all that Locke demands. I do not at present
see how this can be taken as more than an isolated passage,
but it is not the less interesting, especially as iiousseau
has himself noted on the original draft, 'Cette petite piece
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eat trds bonne; il la faut employer. *
This passage may well be the only one in Rousseau*s
works to which we can confidently appeal to show that he was
willing to subordinate the general will to natural lav/, in
the event of a conflict between the two. Surely it is
not enough. Elsewhere we nave to suppose that, although
natural law may be the ultimate authority, it is interpreted
and expressed by the general will: or perhaps, just as
implausibly, that it and the general will cannot clash
because they somehow operate in separate spheres. If
Rousseau believed in the primacy of natural law, as ultimately
interpreted by the individual conscience, it is hard not to
think that he should nave inserted a few remarks to this
effect in the Contrat Social. The fact that he omitted
from the Contrat Social the renunciation of natural law
which appeared in its first draft is not by itself convin¬
cing evidence that he had reversed 0his view.
Our conclusion on this may be brief. In so far as
Rousseau takes over the idea of natural law, he merges it
in his own doctrine of the general will. By implication
therefore he rejects the idea of natural law, and the whole
character of his political schemes emphasises this rejection.
It may have been unintended, in the sense that Rousseau
wished less to destroy natural law theories than to con¬
centrate on his own purpose.
What was this purpose? To sketch an ideal society.
How did he pursue it? By describing how the ideal society
was to be achieved, where he could; by describing what it
was to be like, where he could not. bo it comes about that
a critic as acute as Cobban can defend housseau against the
charge that he does not deal with a clash between the
general will and the individual conscience, by saying (in effect)
that the general will only prevails in an ideal state: when
it is not prevailing, there is always individual conscience
to fall bacK upon.-^9 This is true. But what a comment on
a political theory2 It is as though somebody should produce
a blue-print for achieving a completely law-abiding
community, and when another asks him, "Where are the law-
courts in your plan?" he replies, "You forget that i am
dealing with a completely law-abiding community." The least
we should probably require of such a theorist would be a
certain means of knowing when his ideal became fact and
when it ceased to be fact. Kousseau, as we have seen earlier,
supplies no such means.
Certainly we may easily sympathise with housseau's aims
and allow that he tried consistently, in all his works, to
follow them. As Headel puts it, his fundamental problem
was "to set men free from their own tyranny, tyranny within
as well as without... It was to make human action generally
fair, just, righteous; and society a scene of liberty and
even-handed equality."11^1 In such an attempt Rousseau is
propounding an ideal, but when in 1763 Usteri, a Zurich
minister of religion, wrote to him putting forward the idea
of a political society of Christians, Rousseau replied that
political and civil societies ''are purely human institutions
only the vices of men make these institutions necessary,
and only human passions preserve then Ky dear friend,
you forget that your Christians will be men, that the per¬
fection I suppose them to have is only such as befits
humanity, fy book is not written for Gods."1-*-1 And he
had said similarly in the Contrat Social, "all justice comes
from God, who is its sole source; but if we knew how to
receive so high an inspiration, we should need neither
government nor laws."11™ There can be no doubt that
Rousseau's ideal state masquerades as a practicable one. In
all its aspects therefore, not just in the more realistic
ones, it must be criticised on that basis.
bach of his proposals Is based on the supposition that
an ideal will is going to wield supremacy in his state. He
gives a particular name to the will, so enabling himself to
define as he pleases the right conditions for its expression
These conditions at the best guarantee nothing, and to any
but the smallest states tuey seem hardly applicable. Yet
we have found that Rousseau himself, confronted with larger
states and confederations, clings, however despondently, to
his theories. In this way he goes some distance towards
sanctioning an application of his doctrines to the last
and greatest state of all.
This state, Civitas Maxima, may yet oe influenced if
and when it comes by the brilliant Citizen of Geneva.
Since it, more than any previous political society, will
need careful safeguards against tyranny —- no world-
citizen having the option of emigration, unless to another
planet or another plane of existence it will be wise to
remember exactly what Rousseau, in intention an undoubted
individualist, actually does for the individual in his
schemes. He places on him a hug,e burden of responsibility
that he does not even mention. It is the responsibility of
deciding whether the general will is operating, and what
to do if it io not. And the general will is all too likely
not to be operating. A de facto sovereign can easily take
over each individual's rights, but much less easily
represent each individual's best interests.
Rousseau bad tried to find a means whereby the best
interests of all citizens could be discovered, synthesised,
expressed and enforced by the state power. He achieved
his aim on paper by what Duguit excellently calls a "sleight
of-hand performance".Taken as concrete proposals his
theories are almost certain to foster the despotism and
persecution that he, with good personal reason, loathed.
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!• AN * INDIVIDUALIST* l'Hi-ORY : LQGK5
Natural law instead of the general will
We shall look at Locke more briefly. His political
theories are at once less ambiguous than Rousseau's and more
plainly adaptable to the unlimited community. A consideration
of them is chiefly valuable for comparison.
Even those who deny that Rousseau's theories are
collectivist may allow that they are only individualist in a
quite peculiar way. Locke, by contrast, is an individualist in
the familiar sense of being a liberal, and his political
philosophy has the traditional foundation of natural law.
Except by Willmoore Kendall, who manages to interpret Rousseau
as an extreme individualist and Locke as an exponent of what we
may call majority tyranny, ^ Locke's liberalism is generally
agreed.
Let us run over his natural law doctrine. Locke accepts
the idea of a moral order, ruled by natural law, existing
independently of political society. We are not driven back
on a deduction, as with Rousseau, that because he believes men
to be capable of making a contract he must surely think that
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some morality exists before it is made. Locke says explicitly
that it does. "The state of nature has a law to govern it,
which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that, being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in
his life, health, liberty or possessions...."
In the r,ssav Concerning Human Understanding we are told
how this law of nature is discoverable. The help of positive
revelation is not needed. Natural law is "something that we,
being ignorant of, may attain tQ the knowledge of, by the
use and due application of our natural faculties." At
more length this is set out in the assays on the Law of
Nature. Locke rejects both the proposal that the law of
nature is inborn inscribed in the minds of men -— and
the view that it is to be known primarily or certainly by
tradition. Nor, he judges, can it be known from the general
consent, of men. It is to be discovered through sense-
perception plus reason. "For only these two faculties appear
to teach and educate the minds of men and to provide what is
characteristic of the light of nature, namely that things
otherwise wholly unknown and hidden in darkness should be
able *o come before the mind and be known and as it were
looked into."
It is therefore one of *he chief differences between
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Rousseau's general will and Locke's interpretation of the
law of nature that the latter is in no way less valid or
less discoverable before the social compact is made than
it is afterwards. Rousseau's general v&ll, of course, comes
into being with the making of the contract and ceases to
be realised once the contract is broken. For Locke the
state of nature is not necessarily a state of war;, indeed,
so far as it may happen to be ruled by the law of nature,
it cannot be a state of war. The state of nature simply
describes an unpolitical society. The ramifications of
the social compact itself are less important in Locke's
theory than in Rousseau's. Civil society is set up chiefly
to avert the insecurity and uncertainty, and the risk of
war, that afflict a society still in a state of nature.
When all executive right is in the hands of individuals
both the general right of punishing a man who offends against
natural law, and also the right of the injured party tQ
*ake reparation -— force most easily becomes divorced from
right. For although transgressions should only be punished
"with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill
bargain *o the offender, give him cause t0 repent, and
terrify others from doing the like "» there is then
nobody but the individual t0 judge the proper degree of
severity.
Such insecurity must be avoided. Lach citizen must
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surrender, through the social contract, his executive
power of the law of nature* By so doing he "puts himself
under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit
to the hetermination of the majority, and to be concluded by-
it". 3J-9
This explains well enough why Lock® sees a need to eseao©
from the state of nature, in which the law of nature is valid
but not enforced, to a political society* But it also raises
the question exactly how far the executive power of the law of
nature is to be surrendered, by each individual*
Locke and the individual
The fact that men had natural rights prior to the
social compact does not in itself show that the guardian¬
ship of these rights cannot be alienated* Locke is not
explicit on this and if it were true, as Kendall appears to
believe it Is, that he intends the individual to submit
himself to the majority in every respect, Rousseau, would not
have boon far wrong when he said in Letters from the lountain
that Locke hod treated o the same matters on exactly
the same principles as himself* Indeed Locke would
have provided on this basis fewer safeguards against
tyranny than Rousseau, who does at least make an effort to
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keep his executive subordinated to his sovereign, and also
to see in the sovereign something nobler t ;mi an ordinary
majority vote*
Locke need not be accused of investing the majority
with a magical infallibility* He does think that the
majority is unlikely to assert itself (by revolution)
unless and until it is in fact in the right; but this is
a different thing from supposing that it will be in the
right always* Locks *s "right of revolution" assigns to
the majority a right, in certain circumstances, to use
the power it already assesses —— a power to revolt against
the tyranny of its trustee, the government, over itself.
The circumstances are not likely to include every imposition
of a small injustice* "For till the mischief be grown
general, ana^ill designs of the rulers become visible,
or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the people,
who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by
resistance, are not apt to stir* The examples of particular
injustice or oppression of here and there an unfortunate
man moves the® not." Where the majority is not moved
we can surely take it that the majority is in effect still
. "V '
behina the rulers, even though those rulers are in some
respects acting mischievously. The majority does not, there¬
fore, infallibly enforce th© law of nature.
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The majority is not infallible and injustices may be
committed in its name. These injustices will be perceived by-
Individuals, since, as we have mentioned# Locke states in the
Essays on the Law of Mature that natural law is discovered
through sense-perception plus reason, and is not established
by the general consent of men. And in the Second Treatise
we find that "...every man Is judge for himself,** in all
cases, •#whether another hath put himself into a state of
war with him. Are individuals, despite their power of
judgement, to submit themselves wholly to the majority? Are
they to take no other step to enforce tneir rights than that of
trying to win over a majority of fellow-citizens to their aide?
Such a submission is not quit© proscribed} rather is it
taken for granted. Locke quotes with partial approval a
passage from Barclay which includes these words; "'This,
therefore, is the privilege of the people in general, above what
any private cereon hath: That particular men are allowed by our
adversaries themselves (Buchanan only excepted), to have no
other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may,
with respect, resist intolerable tyranny.... *"123 h© himself
says that the umpire between a prince and some of his subjects
ought to be the body of the people, but if the prince declines
this, "the appeal then lies nowhere but to Heaven.
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in short it is true that Locks, while h© invests neither
people nor prince with infallibility, suggests no effective
means of redress for an individual citizen who has a just
grievance against the government but- whose cause is not taken
up by a majority.
The explanation is not {as we have seen) that Locke failed
to admit a possibility of such cases arising, 'here is no
reason to accuse him of having jettisoned the normal assumption
of natural law theory, that right and wrong are ultimately
determined neither by majorities nor by any temporal authority
at all.
One possible explanation of Locke*s attitude vvould be a
fear that too many individuals might defy the government on
their own initiative, so producing anarchy. This danger had
been voiced by one of Locke's more neglected precursors, Philip
Hunton, in a concise passage in his Treatise of .monarchy. 1643*
Having expressed the opinion that " ♦ • •in a base which transcends
the frame and provision of the Government they are bound to,
People are unbound, and in state as if they had no Government;
and the superiour Law of Reason and Jonscience must, be Judge;"
Hunton immediately warns wherein every one must proceed
with the utmost impartialityI For if hee err© in judgement,
hoe either resists Gods Ordinance, or puts his hand to the
subversion of the State and Policy he live iruH-*"~5
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Locke might have agreed with hunton on this. But the
c ief reason he gives no advice to an individual citizen
oppressed by the state seems to be that he simply sees no
remedy, lie admits that in private cases c-en have a right to
defend themselves against tyranny, but thinks they are un¬
likely to try to do so: "it being as impossible for one or
a few oppressed men to disturb the government where the body
of the people do not think themselves concerned in it, as
for a raving madman or heady malcontent to overturn a well-
settled stats, the people being as little a,t to follow the
one as the other,"126 kgt ug remember that we are not dealing
here with any attempt by a few individuals tc bring down the
government, but merely to resist it on some particular matter.
In admitting that men have a right to defend themselves
against injustice Locke is not altering his theory upon the
right of revolution, a right which tie awards only to a major¬
ity of the people# The paragraph in the Second Treatise from
which we have just quoted does not imply that a minority party
has in any circumstances a right to try to iai ose on the people
a new government; but it perhaps places in some doubt the view
— shared for example by S„h,La-aprecht that Locke will not
permit an individual actively to resist the state; that "his
social theory of the quite limited right of revolution led him
to deny the moral propriety of open o - os.,.tion or rebellion by
a few persons against the magistrates,*127
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The private citizen then is not divested of ©oral
rights against the government, but his hope of expressing
these rights seems slight# One sees how impressive is
feillmoore Kendall*® argument that, in practical effect,
Locks enslaves the individual to the majority. Indeed one
begins to wonder hem the interpretation of ;im as an extreme
126
individualist (e.g. by Vaughan ") was over possible. But
let us look at the question of passive resistance.
Locke speaks oi passive resistance in discussing the
opinions of Barclay, he seems to take a poor view of it.
"How to resist force without striking age,in, or how to strike
with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible....
This is as ridiculous a way of resisting as Juvenal thought
it of fighting..He, therefore, who may resist must be
allowed to strike.Unlike Locke w# may think that passive
resistance is not so ridiculous a way of resisting as it is
of fighting: particularly if what one if? resisting is not so
much the other party*® blows as his commands. If a citizen
has no power to gain redress for himself by active resistance,
passive resistance is his only alternative other than sub¬
mission. In the unlimited community passive resistance may
become more than ever an individual*s only practical means of
obedience to natural law when he conceives this law to be
broken by government.
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In discussing Barclay's views, however, Locke is
really dealing with resistance by a whole community to an
unjust king# Barclay's doctrine of non-retaliation was
particularly unattractive to hi® in this context. Passive
resistance on the pert of an individual is surely another
matter. If we say that. Locke's theory does not ermit it,
we are in danger of interpreting him as more of an absolutist
in a sense than Sir Robert Kilmer himself, for Kilmer, in
his tatriarcna of 16#<0 to which Locke's .• irst "reatise was
of course a reply, expressly allows to the subject a "passive
obedience". Booh man, Kilmer says, needs "a relative know¬
ledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command"; it
is necessary that "every man himself know how to regulate
his actions or his sufferings; for according to the quality
of the thing commanded an active or passive obedience is to
be yielded, and this is not to limit the prince's power, but
the extent of the subject's obedience, by giving to ^feaser
the things that are Baesar's, Kilmer's distinction
between these two Rinds of obedience suggests the legitimacy
of some degree of non-co-operation with government, fee should
expect Lock.© to go as far or farther, and at least to bear
out Laaprecht's interpretation, that the conscientious indi¬
vidual is at liberty to do as he thinks best even if he is
"thus confined to the necessity of passively accepting the
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punishment assigned for violation of the civil laws*"^^
The individual^ ultimate right of decision, his moral right,
is something that JLocke admits ena proclaims*
Locke and the anlimiteu community
Locke takes for granted that the setting for his theories
will be a limited community. It is a curious tact that Filiner
in Patriarchs and Locke in the First Treatise both bring
forward the argument that the works they are attacking, to
be consistent, should call for a world state, Each author
uses this contention as one more proof that the theory he is
opposing is foolish. Filmer, alluding to all who would place
supreme power in the whole people, asks them whether they
mean that all men on earth should meet * o elect a governor.
If not, how has the power of the whole people come to be split
up among separate communities? *Uan they show or prove that
ever the whole multitude met and divided this power which God
gave them in gross b breaking into parcels and by appointing
a distinct power to each several commonwealth? Without such
a compact 1 cannot see —- according tc their own principles
—how there can be any election of a magistrate by any common¬
wealth, but by a mere usurpation upon the privilege of the
8 0
whole world. If any think that particular multitudes at
their own discretion had power to divide themselves into
several commonwealths, those that think so have neither
reason nor proof for so thinking, and thereby a gap is opened
for every petty factious multitude to raise © new common¬
wealth, and to make more commonweals than there be families
in the world. *3.32
Locke, in his turn, uses the existence of separate
sovereignties as an argument against Filler's thesis that
kings derive their authority from Adam. nIf t; are fa© but
one heir of Adam, there can be but on© lawful king in the
world, and nobody in conscience can be obliged to obedience
till it be resolved who that is.... if there be mora than
on© heir of Adam, everyone is his heir, and ;.© everyone has
regal power.jgu^ we find no answer, in Locke's partial
reply to Patriarchs, to the point of filmer's that we have
quoted.
Filmer's observation that the whole population of the
world has never been assembled may lead the reader to the
reflection that neither is it likely to be assembled in the
future. This fact too might pose a problem for Locke were
he to concern himself with an unlimited community, since
supreme power is placed by him in the whole body of citizens.
But the difficulty is less great for Locke than for liousseau.
8 1
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It is true that the people is "sovereign1 In Locke's theory
(unl ess "sovereignty1 be interpreted to mean merely supreme
right irrespective of whether it is associated with power,
in which case sovereignty belongs to natural law} but ""this
power of the people can never take place till the government
be dissolved**^ and unlike Sousseau Loc doos not provide
a mechanism, in the shape of periodical meetings of the
people, for changing the magistrates# i-erhaps he thought
any such meeting impracticable, and nothing seems clearer
than that, in a world state, impracticable it would be#
Locke's 1 i git o: revolution" , also, might become less
practicable than previously. But this is uncertain. Polit¬
ical power might be concentrated and its seat be hard to
change; on the other hand revolutions might be carried
through more easily than before, even, against Locke"s
prescription, by minority groups.
In some other ways too the unlimited community would
perhaps impel Locke to revise his ideas. One of the safe¬
guards he provides for individual freedom would disappear:
the requirement of Individual consent, to the contract.
Interplanetary migration apart., residence within the com¬
munity could less easily be held to imply consent to its form
of political organisation. The situation of atheists and
others, to whom the Lockeian ideal state does not extend
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toleration, would toe worsened.
Despite such difficulties Locke*8 political theory
can lose little validity in the unlimited community, Indeed
from the purely theoretical standpoint it is odd that his
concept of natural rights did not lead him to challenge the
nation-state,-^5 jje says plainly that in relation to the rest
of mankind the nations are still in a state of nature,*36 xs
it not desirable then that there should be a supranational
organisation serving for mankind as a whole the purpose that
any government should serve within s. national community;
i.e. removing from each subordinate party its executive power
of the law of nature? The comparison, after all, is Locke*s,
(lie might alternatively have thought that natural rights are
possessed only by Individual persons, not by communities as
such, and that it is immaterial to the individual under which
government ho lives so long as that government is properly
constituted. If all states were built on the Locketan model
wars might then be unimportant to the citiaen except in so
far as they threatened him with a compulsory change of
nationality,} But Lock© assigns to the 'federative* power
in each state the control of international affairs and then
washes hie hands o- the matter.
That he did so is not altogether surprising. Still, he
is far from being an aggressive nationalist. His political
8 3
philosophy is basically favorable to the development of an
unlimited community, In such a community one o the least
satisfactory points in his theory the position of an
individual in conflict with the majority — may particularly
demand re-examination, and this may involve a closer look
at the question of passive resistance.
8 4
SINCE LOCKS AND ROUSSEAU
In the time both of Locke and Rousseau there was little
support for the notion of a world monarchy and little
visualising of a positive law among nations. Pufendorf
denied even the validity of majority decisions in a confederation
of states, as impinging on national sovereignty. Leibniz and
Montesquieu, however, left room in their theories for some
form of federalism. Federal ideas also came to be re-absorbed
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into what Gierke has stamped as Orthodox' natural-law theory.
In this re-absorption an outstanding figure was Christian
Wolff, whose Lav; of Nations treated on a Scientific Method
was published in 1749. Wolff was original enough to lend his
support to a civitas maxima, but exactly what he meant is
still debatable. The ambiguity of his ideas is concentrated
in this pronouncement: "All nations are understood to have
come together into a state, whose separate members are separate
13$
nations, or individual states." ^ Then when is a state not a
state? Perhaps when it is a supreme state. "The state, into
which nations are understood to have combined, and of which
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they are members or citizens, is called the supreme state."
Wolff explicitly says that the supreme state must have some
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sovereignty over member-nations, just as these nations have
sovereignty over their citizens. The government of the supreme
state must be democratic, since it is unimaginable that the
nations would bestow on any one country a sovereignty over
themselves. But, since the nations do not assemble, how is
this international democracy going to function? Wolff
explains that "that must be taken to be the will of all nations
which they are bound to agree upon, if following the leader¬
ship of nature they use right reason. Hence it is plain,
because it has to be dbnitted, that what has been approved by
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the more civilized nations is the law of nations." This is
not very helpful; it tends to offer a moral complacency to
any nations which, considering themselves to form a majority
of civilised states, wish and are able to coerce other
nations into accepting a particular interpretation of their
national obligations. The functioning of Wolff's supreme
state depends on the ability of a majority of states to agree
on what international obligations are, and having agreed to
enforce their views, "Moreover, it will be evident in its
own place that nothing at all results from this, except those
things which all willingly recognize as in accordance with
the law of nations, or what it is readily understood they
1 L. 1
ought to recognize. A Readily understood by whom? one asks.
The abstraction of Wolff's proposals is best shown by his
remarks about the supreme state's ruler. This ruler is
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unashamedly fictitious. ("Fictions are advantageously allowed
in every kind of science....") He it is who "defines by the
use of right reason^ what nations ought to consider as law
1L2
among themselves....": and it may strike us as a pity that
his enforcement of his decisions will be as fictitious as the
decisions themselves. Wolff*s 1 ruler' is certainly useful to
us, but only because the prescription for his duties illustrates
what needs to be done, and what in fact will not be done,
precisely because he is imaginary. It must be allowed that
Wolff makes a notable advance in approach: recognising the
existence of obligations between nations, he does deduce from
this that the community of humanity has a right to see that
these obligations are carried out. He does not, however,
put forward any idea of a cohesive super-state with a real
ruler and a positive law. He states a need, but supplies too
sketchy an answer. The civitas maxima remains a name.
Theorists of the Rousseau tradition
Making a rough but serviceable division of some modern
writers into Locke and Rousseau factions, we shall assign
Kant to the latter. In the later eighteenth century Kant
made a more striking departure in the direction of inter¬
nationalism than had Wolff, but Kant was at the same time
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a part-inspirer of the so-called idealist school, which so
far as political philosophy is concerned has tended to
idealise the existing nation-state.
Kant's view that mankind progresses by means of mutual
antagonism is explicitly applied by him to nations as well
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as to individuals. Thus far one would expect him to be
a champion of the nation-state. But progress is not for
nothing. Nature employs among people the means of antagonism
"only so far as this antagonism becomes at length the cause of
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an Order among them that is regulated by Law." Presumably,
then, the antagonism of nations is to lead to some form of
world order. And Kant certainly propounds such an order,
but it is not clear whether it is always to remain a form
of confederation distinct from a world state; nor is it clear
whether Kant believes that the ultimate world order will more
or less coincide with the end of time: a view which, if held,
might make it possible to interpret Kant as for practical
purposes a nationalist. The problem will be "the latest to
be solved by the Human Race." If the conditions for a world
society ("above all a good will prepared for the reception of
the solution") are found at all, "it can only be very late in
time, and after many attempts to solve the problem had been
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made in vain."
In his essay on The Principle of Progress Kant speaks
of the danger of a world despotism, though only in tentative
8 8
terms. The evils arising from constant wars bring the states
at last to enter into a "universal or cosmo-politlcal
Constitution. Or, should such a condition of universal
peace as has often been the case with overgrown States
be even more dangerous to liberty on another side than war,
by introducing the most terrible despotism, then the evils
from which deliverance is sought will compel the introduction
of a condition among the nations which does not assume the
form of a universal Commonwealth or Empire under one
Sovereign but of a FEDERATION regulated by law, according
n I/.A
to the Ri~ht of Nations as concerted in common.
To ouch a federation is devoted Kant's noted essay on
Perpetual Peace. Here he plainly says that he is not dealing
with a world state. But it is at best a half-truth to say
that he rejects such a state. A world state is merely
irrelevant to his theme. He explains: "Many nations, however,
in one State, would constitute only one nation, which is
contradictory to the principle assume!, as we are here
considering the Right of Nations in relation to each other,
in so far as they constitute different States and are not to
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be fused into one." Kant hopes that his federation will
serve to avert wars without producing the alternative danger
of a centralised despotism. We may be sceptical of this.
And even in the same essay, he goes on to suggest that the
14S
logical end would be a universal republic; an opinion
which indeed seems the right conclusion from his other
89
theories, however whimsical it appeared in 1795.
J.G. F'ichte is often regarded (and somevrhat regarded
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himself, though hardly with Kant's approval ) as Kant's
philosophical disciple, and also as standing midway, not
only in rough chronology, between Kant and Hegel. So far as
Fichte's perspective on nationalism is concerned, this is
true: but hardly in the sense that he developed Kant's ideas
and left them to be perfected by Hegel. Rather the reverse.
Fichte's original cosmopolitanism, a natural enough
acquisition from the Saxony of his youth, became modified by
a type of nationalism. It was left to Hegel to place even
more faith in nationalism (developing Kant's principle that
antagonism is a means of progress, but leaving aside the
concept of an international order that might be an aim of
this progress).
Fichte was awakened to nationalism, so Treitschke and
others v^ere to say long afterwards, when as a refugee from
French invasion he reached sanctuary at KSnigsberg (the
life-long abode of Kant) in November 1806. Treitschke's view
was an interested one. Shortly before his flight to
KSnigsberg Fichte had published the first of two Patriotic
Dialogues. His winter in exile led to the second. The first
dialogue contains this significant sentence: "And everyone
who in his own nation is a strong and active patriot is
90
thereby also a most active world citizen, for the final end
of all national culture is always this, that it shall spread
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itself over all of mankind." In the second dialogue, first
published in a Berlin journal in June 1307, is the comment:
"It may be that my ideas have found application in another
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way, but they have not changed." So much for any
suggestion that is cosmopolitanism entirely vanished at
Konigsberg. As early as 1796 he had begun to write upon the
ideal state, but he remained aware that there exist more
states than one and that none must dominate or obliterate the
others.
Indeed it was on this ground that Pichte rejected the
idea of a universal monarchy, A universal monarchy, Napoleon
being the monarch, seemed already too near. In his famous
Addresses to the German Nation, delivered after he returned
in 1B07 to Berlin, Fichte said; "Only when each people, left
to itself, develops and forms itself In accordance with its
own peculiar quality... does the manifestation of divinity
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appear in its true mirror as it ought to be." He hoped
for the maintenance of "diverse gradations" among both
peoples and persons.
Such a concept does not explain how each nation or
individual is to concentrate on its own typical development
without frustrating that of its fellows. Kant's idea of an
ultimate world order had suggested that sometime, at least,
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national antagonisms would be raised to a level at which
they would benefit humanity and cause no harm. Kant had
foreseen the danger of a flat universal despotism but had
decided that a federation might be achieved which would
protect differences rather than crush them. Fichte, with
Napoloen perhaps too much in his mind, shied from this.
Admittedly he called for an association of nations, but his
main solution to the problems of how nationalism could develop
harmlessly seems to have been the advocacy, for Germany at
least, of a closed commercial state. Even if not an
impracticable answer, it was an inadequate one. Isolationism
is a solution which ignores both the fact and the function of
antagonism and allows no benefit to humanity as a whole from
the perfection of separate excellences by the various peoples.
It hardly accords with Fichte's belief that national culture
must spread itself over mankind.
Fichte's views on nationality are in this way less
complete than Kant's. But at all events his nationalism
(which we meet again in Mazzini) is not one of domination
but one of resistance to domination. If he encouraged
national assertiveness he encouraged it as a means not to
aggression but merely to national self-preservation. If
isolationism had been impossible, he would more probably
have advocated a federation than have urged on Prussia the
alternative, world-dominion, that he already feared from
France. He does not, for instance (despite his pleas to
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accompany the Prussian troops as an orator, in i£Q6 and 1813)
glorify war. His ideal of patriotism was essentially cultural.
It led him at tiroes to ascribe a superiority to all things
German. Individualism is perhaps always liable to this
descent into egotism, indeed to a limited extent self-
righteousness might be called a pre-condition of individualism,
on the part of nations as of persons.
All Fichte seeks is that the state, with its own special
character, shall be secure. Understandably his chief
prescription for the attainment of security is insularity.
But with the exception of one argument (his belief that the
German language and literature would cease to live if they
no longer belonged to a politically independent community^?
there seems to be nothing in his views which would rule out
the possibility that a world state might sometime be the
best hope of securing, rather than abolishing, national
peculiarities.
Before making the usual connection bet-ween Fichte and
Hegel let us glance ahead and note the equally clear debt
that is ow^ed to Fichte by an un-Hegelian politician, if
politician is the right world, Mazzin*. Maszinl, born in
1$G5 (the same year as Tocqueville in France, a year before
J.S. Mill in England, two and half years before Fichte
commenced his Addresses in the winter of 1B07 in Germany) brings
to mind Fichte as much in his type of nationalism as in some
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other aspects of his outlook {e.g. his strong emphasis on duty
rather than happiness). Like Fichte he started as a cosmo¬
politan, and like Fichte he came to believe that true
cosmopolitanism implied nationalism. Probably the two men
are hardly comparable as philosophers, but their approach
to practical politics appears much the same. Mazzini
illustrates again the sort of nationalism which aims at
opposing domination, rather than at dominating.
It takes the almost inevitable flavour, if not of
aggression, of egotism. The unity of mankind, Mazzini tells
the Italians, can only be given to it "by your country, by
you.... From the Rome of the Caesars went forth that unity
of civilization imposed upon Europe by Force; from the Rome
of the popes was given that unity of civilization imposed
upon the human race by Authority; from the Rome of the
people — when you, Italians, shall be worthier than now
you are will proceed a unity of civilization freely
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accepted by the common consent of the peoples." That he
sought a unity of mankind there is r.o doubt. "To what purpose
do you profess to believe in that unity of the human race
which is the necessary consequence of the unity of God, if
you do not strive to verify it by destroying the arbitrary
divisions and enmities that still separate the different
15c;
tribes of humanity?" ' Whether he may be said to have
reconciled this cosmopolitanism with his nationalism, merely
by speaking of a unity of humanity that will be freely
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accepted by the peoples, is another question. The Europe of
the peoples would be one, "avoiding alike the anarchy of
156
absolute independence and the centralization of conquest."
This is a satisfactory ideal. Mazzinl seems to leave its
exact means of attainment unexplained. He envisages "the
future reorganization of Europe in national unities, possibly
intermixed with free Confederations, protected in their
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independence, and forming a barrier against collisons."
This is as far as Mazzini's, or Fichte's, type of cosmopolit¬
anism seems to take us.
If Maszini was Fichte's disciple as regards his concept
of nationalism, the influence of Kant and Fichte in other
respects is found, of course, outstandingly in Hegel and in
later members of the so-called idealist school. Here we
reach what can be considered a development of Rousseau's
collectivism, just as the work of Tocqueville and Mill can
be regarded with some excuse as being in the tradition of
the individualist Locke. If it is possible to envisage the
application of Rousseau's own doctrines to an unlimited
community, what of those of his nineteenth-century successors?
In his Philosophy ox Right He el observes: "The nation
state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate
actuality and is therefore the absolute power on earth. It
follows that every state is sovereign and autonomous against
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its neighbours." From this and other observations one
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mi ht well say that. Hegel was antipathetic to any form of
internationalism. On the other hand his support for the
nation-state is bound up with the nature of his idealism, i.e.
with the idealising of the political community as he finds it.
Once an unlimited community had actually been set up, it
might not have been very difficult for Hegel to adapt his
theories to suit it. He speaks constantly of * the state' as
though there is one state only, and although he is certainly
reckoning with one state among many, much of his political
theory would be not less tenable if there were, indeed, only
one state to idealise.
A stumbling-block is formed, however, by Hegel's
utterances upon war, He regards the state as an individual
and declares that "Individuality is awareness of one's
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existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others." And
on the basis of Hegel's dialectic the state's individuality
seems to depend, also, on its being able to oppose itself to
other states. What form is this opposition to take?
"Perpetual peace is often advocated as an ideal towards which
humanity should strive. With that end in view, Kant proposed
a league of monarchs to adjust differences between states,
and the Holy Alliance was meant to be a league of much the
same kind. But the state is an individual, and individuality
essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of
states make themselves into a family, this group as an
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individual must engender an opposite and create an esiemy."
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From this reference to enmity in direct connection with
Kant's project for peace, it appears that Hegel believes
the only satisfactory form of competition between states
the only sort of conflict which can confer upon the states
involved the desired condition of individuality to be one
of actual or potential war. Peaceful competition, e.g.
between states which have surrendered their ultimate
sovereignty to some world-wide power, would apparently not
satisfy him, "War has the higher significance that by its
agency, as I have remarked elsewhere, the ethical health of
peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabiliz¬
ation of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the
■winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the
result of a prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations
would be the product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual',
162
peace."
The opinion that individuality implies negation is a
vulnerable one. (Does the work of a dentist conflict with
that of a doctor?) It is arguable that individuality need
imply nothing more than difference. Even if this be granted,
Hegel could admittedly say that a world state, on his view,
would not be an individual. Given his conception of
individuality, his doctrines might best be adapted to the
unlimited community in some way that would try to allow the
member states to remain individuals but, through a federative
system, would rob them of the power to express their
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individuality on the plane of arms. As we have just seen,
even this would represent a definite change in Hegelian
theory, for whether or not Hegel glorified war, he proposed
no means of avoiding it. (As Professor T.M. Knox has
commented in a discussion with E.F. Carritt: Hegel thinks
war necessary and the attempt to abolish it silly.' To this
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assertion 1 raise no objections...." )
It is interesting that in advancing the not unfamiliar
argument that perpetual peace would mean stagnation, He ^el
does not seem to mean that competition would be stifled by
uniformity. He believes that there would be a stagnation of
ail the separate individualities, not a fusion of them. "In
peace civil life continually expands; all its departments wall
themselves in, and in the long run men stagnate. Their
idiosyncracies became continually more fixed and ossified.
But for health the unity of the body is required, and if its
16L
parts harden themselves into exclusiveness, that is death."
This again suggests that for He el the only sufficient
competition is war. But it also tends to support our
contention that, given a need to change that particular view ,
Hegel could have reconciled himself to a federation of
nations: for he apparently believes not that world peace
will suppress the existing individuality of states, but only
that it will hinder their interaction and so their best
development.
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Following Kegelianism into England in the late
nineteenth century (a time when Hegel1s works are said to
have had little vogue in Germany and to have been allowed to
go out of print) we come, still broadly in a Rousseau
tradition, to T.H. Green and the other British 1 idealists*,
(Hobhouse brings forward a pithy definition of their brand
of idealism as one which instead of seeking to realise the
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ideal, idealises the real. Clearly the term idealist can
be just as well applied to people of the opposite turn of
mind, and in everyday life it is more often so applied.) The
British idealists were not solely political philosophers but
like Fichte and Hegel they took politics in their stride.
Despite their considerable differences they are justly called
a school, with Green, Bernard Sosanquet and F.H. Bradley
(the latter rather less a political philosopher) among its
most distinguished scholars. D.G. Ritchie, although he was
of the same circle and may be pictured against a characteristic
physical hackcloth of the idealists ("the Broad and the Turl
wreathed in Scottish mist") is a more doubtful member. It
may be significant that it was Ritchie who wrote a paper on
The Ideal of a World State and who explicitly advocated a
federation, on something like the Kantian model.
T.H.Green, for his part, does not quite reject outright
the idea of an international authority. Unlike Hegel, he is
not willing to countenance war merely on the ground that v-mr
may produce an ultimate good whatever the intentions of the
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warring parties. "If nothing is to be accounted wrong-doing
through which final good is wrought, we must give up either the
idea of there being such a thing as wrong-doing, or the idea
of there being such a thing as final good."1 ^ There is
nothing in the organisation of a state that makes war
necessary: war results not from the organisation of a state,
but from that organisation's defects. "The wrong, therefore,
which results to human society from conflicts between states
cannot be condoned on the ground that it is a necessary
incident of the existence of states. The wrong cannot be held
to be lost in a higher right, which attaches to the maintenance
of the state as the institution through which alone the
16?
freedom of man is realised." At the same time Green sees
some cogency in the view that the establishment of an inter¬
national authority would mean an extinction of the life of
individual states, a result undesirable and for that matter
unattainable: the view that "Projects of perpetual peace,
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to be logical, must be projects of all-embracing empire."
He reconciles his two attitudes -— his rejection of
war, and his distrust of a supranational authority — in a
manner that Bosanquet favoured also. State governments,-
Green considers, must become purely representative of their
respective peoples, so that they will have no dynastic
motives for embroiling themselves with each other. This
accomplished, "there seems to be no reason why they should
not arrive at a passionless impartiality in dealing with
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each other, which would be beyond the reach of the
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individual in defending his own cause against another."
Green rather detracts from the effect of this by suggesting
that when national jealousies have abated, an international
court, "with authority resting on the consent of independent
states", might e useful to deal with difficulties that still
remained.
In saying that states can reach a "passionless
impartiality" such as is beyond the reach of individual
human beings, Green incidentally defends himself in advance
against one of L.T. Hothouse's arguments in that famous
broadside against the idealists, The Metaphysical Theory of
the State. Hothouse points out that Bosanquet, in Social
and International Ideals, devotes a whole chapter to this
argument that f each state will reform itself there will be
no more wars, "As a remedy for war," Hobhouse comments,
"this is a little like the proposal that each man should
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reform himself as a remedy for social injustice." We may
regret that Bosanquet did not think it worth while to take
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more notice of Hothouse's book, for a specific reply to
this point would have been interesting. We can, however,
learn in more detail from Bosanquet the nature of the "passion¬
less impartiality" of which Green speaks.
Bosanquet says that "Plato indeed laid his finger on
the place, though you might criticize his explanation in
some particulars." The origin of war is the internal disease
10 1
and distraction of stages. "Let 'as think further of this.
People who are satisfied do not want to make war; and in a
well-organised community people are satisfied. War must
arise from the dissatisfied elements in a community; people
who have not got what they want within (or have it but are
afraid of losing it) and so look for profit or for security
in adventures without. War belongs to a state, then,
ultimatelyk not in so far as it is a state, but in so far
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as it is not a state." would Bosanquet say, one wonders,
that every state which 'is* a. state must be of equel prosperity
with other states? If not, is there rot an especial danger
that not only some but all elements within some communities
will be dissatisfied, and will look for profit in "adventures
without"? Is not even a well-organised and satisfied
community likely to be anxious about its security so long as
there remains a sin le ill-organised state at large? The
idealists' theory on this matter remains as unrealistic as
Hobhouse said it was. Its unhelpfulness can be illustrated
by reference to the life of Bosanquet himself. "At one
time;" his wife wrote, "he had no great belief in the possib¬
ility of an effective League of Nations, but later on he
became a convinced supporter of it, regarding it as the only
means of averting renewed disaster, and becoming a member of
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the League of Nations Union."
To some extent Bosanquet did become an internationalist.
And he provides us with one of the most direct approaches
10 2
which has been made by a theorist of the Rousseau tradition
to the question of an unlimited community. Writing on 'The
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function of the state in promoting the unity of mankind',
he observes that his ideas are his own: "But, to the best of
my judgement, they represent the Greek tradition as renewed
by Hegel and by English thought." Later he associates himself
with Mazzini's doctrine of the individual missions of states;
elsewhere, again, he illustrates his ideal of patriotism by
reference to Fichte. To a considerable degree lie blends the
ideas of all the post-Rousseau writers we have so far
discussed. In the later period of his life, then, what form
did his international sympathies take?
Bosanqnet leans heavily on the theory of a general will.
In discussing this concept as one fundamental to Rousseau,
we dealt separately with the issues (1) whether there is
such a will, and (2) whether a means can be found for its
expression. In referring to the possible application of
Rousseau's ideas to a world community, this separation was
maintained. We decided that Rousseau might quite possibly
have admitted the feasibility of a general will of the world
(distinct from natural lav;} and also that, in something of
the manner in which he proposed means for the expression of
the general will in Poland, he might propound methods for
its expression in a world state. Let us look at Bosanquet's
approach.
In The Philosophical Theory of the State Bo:, quet said
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that no such identical experience can be supposed in all
mankind as is necessary to the exercise of a general will.
175
(We quoted this earlier. ) In Social and International
Ideals he in no way departs fro© his emphasis on the general
will; taking self-government as the primary question in any
problem affecting the state he reiterates the need for a
general will, "which involves the existence of an actual
community, of such a nature as to share an identical mind
and feeling..,." This is "the universal condition of
legitimate outward authority." But immediately he proceeds:
"City-state, Nation-state, Commonwealth, Federation, World-
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state, it makes no difference." Then is a general will of
the world conceivable? Sosanquet is reluctant to envisage
one, but he seems less dogmatic than before. "But I do not
suggest that larger units than nation-states can never come
to fulfil these conditions; only that, if they do, they
must have achieved a unity comparable to that which we now
experience in nationality alone. I do not say this is
impossible to be realised at some remote period even in a
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world-state."
Why, one begins to ask, is Bosanquet apparently anxious
to thrust as far away as possible this chance that there
may develop a general will of the world such as, on his own
showing, would make a world state a reasonable proposition?
Why does he give warmer approval to a 'system1 of states
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(presumably on the lines that were to be followed by the
League of Nations), remarking that there is no need for an
explicit federation? ("Those who think federation necessary
for the sake of a central force, obviously believe in force
rather than friendship. But without friendship the force
17$
is dangerous, and with it, perhaps, hardly necessary." )
Bosanquet sounds doubtful about his arguments, yet firm in
his distrust of an unlimited community.
An explanation emerges. It is crystallised in the
second half of the following sentence: "The organism of
humanity, though conceivable, is at present as we saw a mere
possibility, and the idea of it contains a serious contra-
179
diction between quality and totality." And later; "The
opposite ideal, that of a v/orld state, is, of course
conceivable. The point of interest is, I think, whether the
identification of spirit and experience necessary as the
basis of a general will could be achieved without the
sacrifice of the valuable individual qualities of national
160
minds."
This point of interest is no small one. It is different
from the objections to a world community which we decided
might have been made by Hegel. Neither does there appear to
be any precedent for it in Rousseau. Certainly Rousseau did
not treat of a world community, but he dealt at some length
with the general will and it is a. cherished dogma of his
that the general will represents the best will of every
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citizen. How then could any true general will sacrifice any
"valuable individual qualities", either of national minds
or individual ones? Everything that was of value would
presumably be incorporated in, and preserved by, the general
will of the world. Surely the fact is that Bosanquet,
influenced by the concept of antagonism between nations as
a means to progress a doctrine common in one way or
another to Kant, Fichte and Hegel —— has brought a new
strand into Rousseauesque political theory. To claim that
♦the state' is an individual is one thing; to stress that
the good of humanity demands that different such individuals
should be in conflict with each other is another. Bosanquet
has accepted so much of the latter thesis that the prospect
of a world state puts him in a serious dilemma. Either he
must abide by Rousseau and. accept that (once a world general
will became possible) the world's general will would embrace
all diversities useful to humanity, or else he must at this
tage abandon his reliance on general will theory: in which
case we may very well ask whether a general will does riot
already contain in a nation state the same "contradiction
between quality and totality" that it would contain in a
world state.
Bosanquet, we may think, sees looming ahead of him a
disproof (in terms of his own beliefs) of the whole theory
10 6
of the general will. He avoids shipwreck by steering back
to the nation state.
Other successors of Hegel fared differently. On one
hand Marx, it might be said, had arrived at a form of inter¬
nationalism; or. another Treitschke represented the full
development (or debasement) of Fichte's and Hegel's nationalism.
Among late nineteenth century militant nationalists
Treitschke is conspicuous. But his tendency metaphorically
to don the pickelhaube distracts full attention from his
not quite fanatical theories. For instance he is said (with
plausibiJity) to have glorified war, but even this is
contestable. At one point, certainly, we find him saying that
"the God above us will see to it that war shall return again
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a terrible medicine for mankind diseased." A.J. Balfour,
in his introduction (published during the first world war)
to a translation of Treitschke*s Politics, deals caustically
with this, as well he might. But Treitschke does go on to
admit that wars impose increasing burdens, and even that
mankind ha3 a natural horror of bloodshed* Therefore "it
is not denied that the progress of culture must make wars
both shorter and rarer, for with every steo it renders men's
lives more harmonious." But as to wars ceasing altogether,
"They neither can nor should, so long as the State is
IB 2
sovereign and stands among its peers." Then is it
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envisaged that the state will cease to be sovereign and to
stand among peers? Unfortunately for anyone who would like
to think thatf-Treitschke does not even condone (as distinct
from glorify) war, it is not.
Treitschke may not himself quite deify the state (he
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refers to Hegel, incidentally, as deifying it ) but he does
award it a personality, and says: "Treat the State as a
person, and the necessary and rational multiplicity of
States follows. Just as in individual life the ego implies
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the existence of the non-ego, so it does in the State."
The chief duties of every state, he says, are war and the
administration of justice; these duties are only conceivable
where there is a plurality of states. (One wonders in what
way the administration of justice in a world state is
inconceivable.) "Thus the idea of one universal empire is
odious the ideal of a State co-extensive with humanity
is no ideal at all. In a single State the whole range of
culture could never be fully spanned; no single people could
unite the virtues of aristocracy and democracy...." Treitschke
breaks into fine imagery in support of this declaration,
painting ; picture that Fichte, or Bosanquet, could easily
have approved. "The rays of the Divine light are manifested,
broken by countless facets among the separate peoples, each
oh'e exhibiting another picture and another idea of the whole.
Every people has a right to believe that certain attributes
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of the Divine reason are exhibited in it to their fullest
perfection. So people ever attains to national consciousness
18 5
without overrating itself."
Given that this is true, cannot one say much the same
of every individual? Treitschke does suggest the comparison,
immediately prior to the sentences just quoted. "All nations,
like all individuals, have their limitations, but it is
exactly in the abundance of these limited qualities that the
genius of humanity is exhibited." Individuals, we may wish
to remind him, sometimes find that peaceful co-existence
within the state may develop their qualities, rather than
crush them. Cannot nations usefully co-exist under one
authority to the same end? From our point of view it is here,
above all, that Treitschke's theory shows its limitations.
The limitations can be exaggerated; Treitschke tends in any
case to be inconsistent. He demands that .separate states
raust retain their sovereignty and accordingly he does not
regard war as a prime evil. let at one point he envisages a
voluntary 'restriction' upon, sovereignty, and an international
harmony; "we see at once that it cannot be the destiny of
mankind to form a single State, but that the ideal towards
which we strike is a harmonious comity of nations, who,
concluding treaties of their own free will, admit restrictions
IS6
upon their sovereignty without abrogating it." For a
militant nationalist this view is quite a long one. It is a
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pity that it can hardly be reconciled with the statement that
while states remain sovereign, wars should not altogether
cease. Even though states of their own free will 'admit
restrictions' upon their sovereignty, one imagines that
Treitschke intends them to remain ultimately 'sovereign
states'.
Karl Marx, by contrast, had of course been primarily
concerned neither with nationalism nor with internationalism.
He may be described as an incidental internationalist, but
even this is not to be taken for granted. It is a well-known
point in Marx's theory that ultimately, in the classless
society, the state will wither away. This doctrine is what
might be expected, since Marx sees the 'state' as an
instrument of class domination: but that interpretation of
the word makes it unsafe to conclude that he necessarily
expects nationality (even in the political sense) to fade
away too. And allowing that it may do so ultimately, what of
the two transition periods — the periods in which first,
the bourgeois states are said to be overthrown, and secondly,
the resulting proletarian states begin to wither? While
bourgeois and proletarian states exist side by side, there
would seem to be scope for argument as to whether on Marx's
premises some form of nationalism and insularity, of a defensive
kind, is not necessary to the proletarian states both for the
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protection of the revolution within them and for its
encouragement elsewhere —- on the supposition that unless and
until the revolution is world-wide, the withering away of
even a proletarian state will be hindered.
However this may be, Marx and Engls express disapproval
of conflicts between the peoples. The Communist Manifesto says
that "National differences and antagonisms between peoples
are daily ore and more vanishing, owing to the development
of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world
market, to uniformity in the .•rode of production and in the
conditions of life corresponding thereto"; and it immediately
proceeds: "The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to
vanish still faster." Exploitation between nations is to
end at the same time as exploitation between individuals.
"In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the
nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will
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come to an end,""" It remains possible to contend that Marx
and Engels do not foresee the disappearance of all national
distinctions and peculiarities, but only of invidious ones,
and that a uniform economic system does not, preclude variety
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in other ways. At least they would have been unlikely to
maintain that their theories were without relevance to an
unlimited community, however much they may fall short of
insisting upon such a community.
Ill
Theorists of the Lock® tradition
So much for some outstanding modern writers mainly of
the Rousseau tradition, and their varying attitudes to an
unlimited community. On the other side, that of the liberal
or individualist or broadly Lockeian school, there is less
to say. But writers who place a hi ;h value or. individual
freedom within the state (and who do so without inventing
any new interpretation of the word ♦freedom') have steadily
tended to be more sympathetic than collectivists to the ideal
of a world community. We shall suggest a reason for this
shortly.
A word initially on Jeremy Bentham. Bentham rather
strikes the eye of anyone contemplating the unlimited
community, if only because he coined the word 1international'
and because, like Kant (of whom as a person he somewhat
reminds us) he evolved a plan for perpetual peace. Bentham
invents the term 'international' jurisprudence on the
ground that the usual description, 'law of nations', is
ambiguous: i.e. can be understood to mean internal laws,
rather than those governing the behaviour of states towards
1^9each other. He is not proposing a new kind of law
enforced by an international body.
Beginning his essay on the objects of international law,
Bentham asks: "If a citizen of the world had to prepare an
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universal international code, what would he propose to
himself as his object? It would be the common and equal
utility of all nations: this would be his inclination and
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his duty." To nations as well as individuals he seems to
have applied the "greatest happiness" principle. His plans
for the avoidance of war include a confederation of nations
and international arbitration. He wishes also to see a
universal language, founded on English. If his proposals
have an arid air-, they are none the less admirably sensible.
Bentham had the virtues as well as the limitations of a
1 galistic mine, but his theories are not very important for
us here.
Let us i.ove to Tocquevilie, who, although one of his
major works was published only three years after Bentham
died, brings us to another world. Even more than his friend
Mill, whom he rcatly influenced, Tocquevilie was a prophet
and critic of completely exceptional insight. He is the
first, and still the greatest, political philosopher of the
modern democratic era. It can be said at once that he does
not forecast the development of a world state, but then that
would have been a the.we rather far removed from his basic study,
Democracy in America.
Tocqueviile is in the Loekeian tradition primarily in
that he stands, as Locke is generally agreed to have done,
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for a maximum of individual freedom. Foreseeing the growth
of an ever-greater uniformity, he fears an intangible
oppression exercised over men's souls and minds. He is dealing
with a kind of society which Locke and Rousseau could hardly
have ima ined ^though we quoted earlier some of Rousseau's
comments on conformity, which are not without relevance to
Tocqueville's views). 'Democracy', as Tocquevillo used the
word, meant much more than a political system; it was a new
society, a new way of life, towards which the world was
destined to move. The tendency was not to be challenged. But
Tocqueville believed that by diminishing some people's
enthusiasm for democracy, and other people's terror of it,
he could do something to see that "society could advance
more peacefully toward the necessary accomplishment of its
destiny. There you have the idee mere of the work, the idea
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which links all the other ideas intc a single system."
Because the dangers which Tocqueville envisaged v/ere not
merely political, it would be too much to suppose that much
could be done to guard against them by either limiting or
increasing the size of the political community. Tocqueville
did believe, however, that something could be done. "If
none but small nations existed, I do not doubt that mankind
would be more happy and more free; but the existence of
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great nations is unavoidable." $hat was the best solution?
Tocqueville was favourably impressed by the American system,
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federalism. (Incidentally he appears not to distinguish between
a federation and a confederation; perhaps this is the reason
he thinks a new word is needed to describe "a state of things
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which must be styled an incomplete national government..
i.e., like the American government.} At the present day he
would be more than likely, arguing from necessity, to advocate
the development of the unlimited community.
But he would be aware of the way in which such a community
could intensify the dangers he feared. "It has been observed...
that the intensity of human passions is heightened, not only
by the importance of the end which they propose to attain,
but by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them
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at the same time." A world state would surely accelerate
the removal of diversity, of which he remarked: "The Middle
Ages were a period when everything was broken up; when each
people, each province, each city, and each family had a strong
tendency to maintain its distinct individuality. At the
present time an opposite tendency seems to prevail, and the
nations seem to be advancing to unity.... The consequence
is that there is less difference, at the present day, between
the Europeans and their descendants in the New World than
there was between certain towns in the thirteenth century
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which were only separated by a river," The importance
for Tocquevilie of any acceleration of this tendency-—in
view of his belief that freedom is most in danger in a
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uniform or equalitarian society—-is obvious.
There is every reason to suppose that John Stuart Mill
would approach the unlimited community with the same mixture
of approval and distrust. In the first place, he has
nothing against a greater union as such. In Representative
Government he remarks: "Whatever really tends to the
admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their
attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit
to the human race. Not by extinguishing types, of which,
in these cases, sufficient examples are sure to remain, but
by softening their extreme forms, and filling up the intervals
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between them." In a letter written in 1»?1 he said of
the idea of a United States of Europe that "there can be no
advanced philanthroplst who does not look forward to
something of the kind as the ultimate result of human
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improvement." In the second place, on the other hand,
Mill was no advocate of any kind of union at all costs.
He observes at one point, "Free institutions are next to
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.
Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they
read and speak different languages, the united public
opinion, necessary to the working of representative govern-
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ment, cannot exist." This is reminiscent of Rousseau's
postulate of a general will, and we may think that in
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circumstances where national divisions create acute dangers
for all parties, it is sufficiently satisfied.
Mill, like Tocqueville, looks with favour on federalism,
and like Tocqueville he thinks it must be sought in its
American form, whereby federal laws are obeyed by each
citizen individually and are enforced by the federal power.
Hot, in other words, a mere confederation. And, "The usual
remedies between nations, war and diplomacy, being precluded
by the federal union, it is necessary that a judicial
remedy should supply their place. The Supreme Court of the
Federation dispenses international law, and is the first
great example of what is now one of the most prominent wants
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of civilised society, a real International Tribunal."
In sum, "When the conditions exist for the formation
of efficient and durable Federal Unions, the multiplication
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of them is always a benefit to the world." A centralised
authority does not necessarily, on Mill's view, entail the
abolition of national diversities or of individual liberties.
The other nineteenth-century figure we are going to
classify as in the Lockeian tradition, Lo?d Acton, went
much further. To him, "the theory of nationality" was an
enemy of the individuality and freedom for which, like
Tocqueville and Mill, he stood. But the theory of nationality,
in this sense, was something which he associated with the
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concept of the general will# It was a theory of unity, of
unity at all costs, unity interpreted as something like
uniformity. In short, the theory of nationality which
Acton was setting up for attack was one which, on his view,
sought to subject each man to a government which would be
more absolute than was possible in a multi-racial society.
In his well-known essay on 'Nationality1, therefore,
written when he was 28, Acton set out his fundamental
argument on the matter: "Private rights, which are sacrificed
to the unity, are preserved by the union of nations." ...
"The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty
is similar in its effect to the independence of the Church
in the State. It provides against the servility which
flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by
balancing interests, multiplying associations, and giving to
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the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion,"
Acton also contends, reasonably enough, that the present in a
state of diverse races will act as a barrier to the govern¬
ment's intrusion beyond the political sphere into social
matters. From another angle, it is desirable as a means to
the improvement of the races themselves. "It is in the
cauldron of the State that the fusion takes place by which
the vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity of one portion of
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mankind may be communicated to another."
1
We may wonder, nevertheless, whether the Union of races
does not carry disadvantages, on which Action does not dwell.
Is not their separate existence a safeguard — from the
viewpoint of humanity as a whole of that diversity
which, from the viewpoint of each separate state, can only
be provided by their amalgamation? Acton does say that "A
State may in course of time produce a nationality...He
also remarks of states that "Those in which no mixture of
races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which it3
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effects have disappeared are decrepit." J (My italics.)
The question arises whether an unlimited community which
had in this manner become decrepit could in any way be
rejuvenated, in the absence of fresh races which it could
absorb. There appears to be no direct help here from Lord
Acton.
Why, in fact, are not such asen as Tocqueville, Mill and
Acton more preoccupied with the utility of national barriers
as an encouragement to diversity in the world as a whole?
Perhaps one reason is that those writers whose theories
start froai an emphasis on individuality at the personal
level — instead of starting from a coliectivist theory
of the state and only stressing the need for human diversity
at an inter-state level, i.e., "group" individuality -«—
have a particular reluctance to let competition between
1
individual states take the form of war. For the rough
ai-hitration of war is likely to be even more unjust to
numerous individual citizens than to their communities.
Also, the liberal thinker does not believe a rejection of
state authority to he implied by the maintenance of
diversities between persons, and it is therefore easier
for 'rim than for the collectivist to imagine national
diversities being preserved in a world state: especially
since he might not mind if the preservation of all human
differences came to depend more upon private choice than
upon state tradition.
At the same time, a thorough-going collectivist has
no greater reason to oppose the unlimited community as such
than has an individualist. A writer like Boaanquet distrusts
it only because he sees where his own theories may take him
if they arc applied on a world scale. Part of the
inspiration of his collectivism has been a patriotic
sympathy which clearly, in the sphere of inter-state politics,
inspires the opposite feeling: one of national 'individualism
Such a theorist is an illustration in himself of the absence
of a world patriotism (if one likes, of a world general will)
that would take precedence over state patriotism. Given a
primary loyalty to the world community, his political
philosophy could be transferred to that community.
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In fact our short review of some writers since Locke
and Rousseau brings us to the same conclusion that we drew
from those two modern father-figures themselves. The two
great mainstreams of political thought have flowed erratically
in time through polls and through nation. Sometimes they
have seemed to be close together but generally they have
been distinguishable. Neither stream is likely to yield
itself to the other as they cross the chronological border of
a universal state.
5. THE REVISION OF TERMINOLOGY
One of the plainest conclusions from any review of
the political theories of the past is that they would be
easier to compare, and even to reconcile, if they were
expressed in a common terminology. If political philosophy
is to have an honest role in the unlimited community it
will be important to try to establish e terminology which,
if not inflexible, will at least be more standardised than
that used by Locke and Rousseau, ^o far as can be managed,
separate concepts must at last be given separate and agreed
names. We shall suggest here a few major definitions, making
a start with 'power' and 'right' (positive right, the right
to command).
Power, Right, Authority
Political theorists usually try to devise means of
concentrating power and right in the same hands. Both
Rousseau and Locke attempted this. Rousseau did so
sweepingly and vaguely; he decided that right rested with
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the whole people arid he tried to equip them with effective
power. Locke did so more cautiously; he concluded that right
rested with the whole people under God, and that power, if
not usually exercised by them, was conferred by them and
might be resumed by them if a government broke the trust they
had placed In it.
Not many people would say that power and right do
inevitably go together. A man carrying a revolver whom one
meets in the street has power over one: he can force one,
unless one thinks it worth while to jeopardise one's life,
to hand him a purse or wallet. Has he any sort of right?
He has the 'right' of the strongest and if this is a valid
right then the usurper of a throne becomes the 'rightful'
ruler the moment his supremacy is established. Recognition
of this sort of right clearly makes for utter instability;
anyone who wishes to have any control over his own life
must then engage ceaselessly in a trial of strength. There
arises a condition of general war. And it is the very object
of the political society to replace such a condition of war
by one of co-oneration. (We can think, if we wish, that men
drew up a social contract to make explicit this aim.) Never¬
theless what we must primarily insist upon is not a denial that
power can ever produce right, but merely an admission that
the two things, power and right, are intrinsically different.
The concept of power is at the centre of political 3tudy. 4
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A writer says of It typically enough: "A political community,
unlike other societies, cannot realise its being and perform
its functions, especially those of maintaining order and of
punishing crime, without possession of power and physical
2 05
force." u Power and physical force*5 It might be argued that
the distinction is necessary because a leader, say a priest,
may exercise power over his followers though he has no physical
force at his disposal. If a nan admits another's 'right'
moral or legal to be obeyed on a certain point, then the
second man, it might be said, automatically has power. This
is a confusion. No outside power is being exercised upon the
first individual. He chooses to obey for some reason of his
own, such as that he recognises the second man as the legitimate
representative of a moral or legal order to which he considers
that he himself also owes allegiance. It is perfectly true
that this attitude on the part of the man who obeys confers
independent power upon the man who gives the order but only
in relation to some third party, who is confronted by the
fact that the man giving the order has a follower who may
help to enforce it. Prora the viewpoint of the third party the
man giving the order has then power, whether or not he also
has right.
Some forces, such as that of public opinion, are not
perhaps to be described as physical force, though in all
ways they shade into it. We are free to call them *non-
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physical force1, but force in some sense they are, and are
properly described as 'power*. A threat of force which has
to be taken seriously is reasonably described as force.
Our interpretation of these words is not that of
Mr. T. D. Weldon, who has written: "power is quite a different
thing from strength or force. It is not even legalised
force, though legality is an element in it. Power is more
accurately the control of force authorised by consent....
For power used irresponsibly is no longer power. It is simply
force, which may command obedience, but not respect."^06
Mr. Weldon's interpretation of power seems to be one of
♦force plus right': a specialised right, formed by consent.
Our own interpretation is simply that of force, of one kind
or another. The word 'power' carries no overtones of 'right*
or 'legality'. Speaking socially and politically (in a
general way, power means merely the ability to produce an
intended result) power implies the means to compel, with
hardship as the alternative to submission. Power is Might.
Just as power can exist as a fact without possessing any
element of 'right', so Right, the foundation of authority,
can exist without having any connection with political power.
It is indeed because these things can exist independently of
each other that an absolute distinction needs to be made between
words which denote one, words which denote the other, and words
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which cover both.
Suppose we say that a magistrates' court in Britain has
a 'right' to try a certain type of case. We may be alluding
to a moral or legal right which that court possesses, or we
may loosely be referring to the fact that it has power to
try such a case: to the fact that the government of the
country, in the last resort, will lend its power to the
magistrates' court in defence of the court's right. To use
the word 'right' in this second sense is very natural, just
as it is natural for lawyers to use the word 'power' when
they mean 'legal right'. But it is strictly erroneous. What
we wish to say is that the court has right, or that it has
power, or that it has both right and power. Perhaps we have
been led into confusion by the fact that in Britain acknowledged
right and de facto power have for long gone together.
A distinction is reasonably to be made between moral
right and legal right; but it is not of the first importance.
Suppose, for example, that a governor issues an order which we
think contravenes natural law, but which is in accordance
with the law of the land. Has he 'right' on his side?
Disregarding whatever power he may possess, should he be obeyed?
The distinction between moral and legal right, though valid,
is seen to be cot fundamental. Whether we recognise both the
natural and the written law or only one of them, we must
believe in the end either that the man has a 'right' to have
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his order obeyed, or that he has not.
'Right' is in fact something the existence of which, in
any given case, must be accepted or rejected by each individual.
If a government makes an order, it is for the individual to
decide whether he accepts the government as legitimate and
its order as 'legal', and also, if he believes in the
superiority of a moral law, whether he accepts the government's
order as not contravening that law. (And if he does not,
whether he thinks the order is so seriously unethical and
important as to justify him in departing from the normal duty
of obeying the government's commands.)
There is no valid distinction between authority and
active right. Just as there are moral and legal rights, so
there is moral and legal authority: and either sort of
authority may exist divorced from power. Perhaps this is
least true if we imagine a country that has no legal code
whatever. The whims of its ruler are, and have always been,
its only recognised laws. Command is then law, and power
carries with it legal authority, in so far as that may be
said to exist. And if it is decided that there is no such
thing as moral authority, then in that country 'might'
constitutes right and authority in all senses. But once
depart from these stringent conditions —- once accept that
the fact of a man's holding a gun does not give him legal
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authority over another, or that even if it does, there
still exists a moral authority which is not to be so
conferred and it becomes clear that power is not
synonymous with right and authority.208
Again, as with right, in the last resort either moral
or legal authority must be deemed superior. To say this is
not to say that is is a mistake to use the word 'authority*
in its common sense. A schoolmaster may have authority,
at least legally, to order a boy to do homework; but it
might be said that he has no authority, at least morally,
to order a boy to commit murder. It i.3 nevertheless perfectly
reasonable in everyday speech to say that the master 'has
authority' over the boy. Only if the master does order the
boy to commit some crime, and expects obedience on the ground
of his 'authority', does it become important for the boy to
have a clear idea of the facts that authority takes varying
and sometimes conflicting forms, that the affected individual
must finally decide for himself where it lies, and that the
decision, particularly for those who credit the existence of
a moral law that may override a written one, cannot always
be made by reference to a book of rules.
Sovereignty
One's view of the term 'sovereignty' is probably crucial.
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It is a word commonly used to imply a mixture of authority
and power. At its most Inclusive it has been used to mean
supreme right plus supreme power. Perhaps no word in
political philosophy has caused more confusion and perhaps
none more harm. It will be our contention here that
'sovereignty* is a word that should mean no more than supreme
power supreme legally constituted power if that exists,
and otherwise supreme power however constituted.
This may appear to be too arbitrary an interpretation
of the terra. So contradictory and confusing have been previous
attempts to define sovereignty that, as Eees pointed out in
1950, "There is a tendency among present-day political
theorists to work without the aid of the concept of
sovereignty."2^ A still more recent analysis, by Benn,21®
closes with the suggestion that there is a strong case for
dropping the word. Laski also thought so.21-*- Maritain
agrees.212 But there is a stronger case for not doing so.
The disavowal of the term by those who see its ambiguities
will not prevent its being invoked, carrying the grand
overtones of centuries, by persons who seek a confusion of
right with power for their own ends.
Bryce, in a well-known nineteenth century exposition
of sovereignty, divides it simply into two categories:
legal and de facto.2l'^ He has a preference for its use in
the former sense. An analysis slightly more complex was
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made by Ritchie, who recognises three sovereigns rather than
two: nominal, legal, political.514 Ritchie's nominal
sovereign may be equated roughly with the de facto sovereign
of Bryce; the novelty he introduces is the 'political*
sovereign. Since he says that "All ultimate questions of
political, as distinct from mere legal, right are questions
of might",215 the distinction between nominal and political
sovereigns does not seem fundamental. The sultan who wishes
to burn the Koran may be the nominal and legal sovereign; the
public that makes it unthinkable for him to burn the ?;oran
(the illustration is Ritchie's) is the political sovereign.
But the person or body that really determines th© matter is,
surely, the de facto sovereign for the purpose. By Bryce's
definition the sultan would presumably be the legal sovereign,
and the public the de facto sovereign. Is not this an
adequate classification?
Rees extends the alternative meanings of sovereignty to
• ->
half-a-dozen. They are (1) legal, (2) legal plus moral,
(3) coercive, (4) socially coercive i.e. the force of a
majority, (5) influential, (6) any supreme power, authority or
influence that is permanent. But he manages in the course of
his argument to reduce these sorts of sovereignty to three:
by counting together the coercive and socially coercive types
and by abandoning the use of the word in his sixth sense (to
connote permanence) and in his second sense (to imply supreme
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legal authority that is also completely moral). His
rejection of this second interpretation of sovereignty is
particularly important, for it is of course the interpretation
used by Rousseau, and the one which more than any other makes
the concept of sovereignty useless in practice. Bees leaves
us with the legal, coercive, and influential sovereigns: a
classification very similar to Ritchie's and one against
which we may bring the same charge of superfluous complexity.
The 'influential' sovereign, in so far as it operates by any
means of compulsion or intimidation, is part of the 'coercive'
sovereign. In so far as it does not so operate, it is a
force too intangible to be usefully categorised in political
theory.
Something on these lines is said by Benn, who after
pointing out that in politics 'influence' means influence with
intention (as distinct from the sort of influence implied
in the statement "Climate influences vegetation") stresses that
"In seeking an influential sovereign... we should be seeking
a stable dominant influence over a fairly wide range of
political issues." To assign influential sovereignty to 'the
majority' will not do. The majority is a different majority
on each issue.
We are left then with legal, and with coercive,
sovereignty. The forcier has some degree of right, the latter
need not be associated with any right at all. Let us consider
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whether it is not reasonable to say that legal sovereignty
is a concept less important than sovereignty de facto: that,
in fact, right is never more than an accidental accompaniment
of sovereignty.
Bryce, for his part, seems not to think it worth while
even to consider whether sovereignty may connote ultimate
right. "All civilised nations," he finds, "...hold that in
the internal affairs of a Ctate, power legally sovereign
even if the Constitution subjects it to no limitation
ought to be exercised under tHose moral restraints which are
expected from the enlightened opinion of the best citizens,
and which earlier thinkers recognised under the name of Natural
Law.And this was indeed the view of Bodin, in his
De Republics of 1576. Bodin, as Carlyle says, "is setting
out what in later tiraes we should call the theory of the
sovereignty of the State. ',V0 must, however, be careful to
observe that Bodin recognises that there is one immensely
important limitation of this absolute power in the State.
Supreme power is always subject to the authority of the divine
law, of the natural law, and of the law of nations."217
In contrast we have the view adopted by Housseau and
some others: that sovereignty means supreme right, which
should also exercise supreme power. This view, as we have
suggested, renders the whole concept of sovereignty useless.
For even Bousseau is unable to provide the individual citizen
with a means of ascertaining whether the instructions he
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receives actually emanate from the sovereign from
supreme right, from the general will —- or merely from an
imposter, the 'will of all'. This view of sovereignty must
be rejected, as it is rejected by Rees. The seat of supreme
power can be pragmatically found; the seat of supreme right
cannot be so found. Sovereignty then, if it is to mean
anything in practice, must centre on power.
To say this is not to deny that supreme power ought, if
possible, to be legally constituted before it is termed
sovereignty, and so to possess some measure of right. It is
to say that because no sovereign has a monopoly of moral
right, its possession of even the most indisputable rights
at law constitutes no ultimate moral compulsion on an
individual. Supreme moral right springs within the individual;
sovereignty Is essentially something outside him, something
with which supreme right may contend.
If we take this view we reject completely those theories
of sovereignty which as de Jouvenel says "tend to render
subjects obedient by revealing to them a transcendent
principle behind the Power they see; this principle, whether
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God or the People, is armed with an absolute authority."
We resolve the conflict which de Jouvenel illustrates by a
comparison of Augustine's view (shared by Locke) and
Spinoza's (shared in de Jouvenel's view by Rousseau).
Spinoza says: 'The sovereign, to whom all is of right
allowed, cannot violate the rights of the subjects'.
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Augustine says: '...inasmuch as we believe in God and have
been summoned to His kingdom, we have been subjected to no
man who should seek to destroy the gift of eternal life
which God has given us'.
In everyday use, no doubt and in a stable civilisation—
the term sovereignty may reasonably continue to cover both
power and right. But when serious conflicts arise, it must
be interpreted so as to exclude utterly that final authority
and right the seat of which is determinable only by the
individual.
Is sovereignty indivisible? Bodin thought it was. The
theories which award to sovereignty an almost or wholly
mysiical authority tend to agree with him. On our view,
Bodin was mistaken in this. Sovereignty means ultimate
power: if we like, ultimate legal power. This ultimate power
can be single or collective. If a community has a dictator
supreme in all matters, then sovereignty in that community
is single. If on the other hand there is in the community
a balance of power between, say, parliament and judiciary
neither having final authority over the other nor even being
able, except by mutual consent, to fix the other's sphere of
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authority then sovereignty is divided. Take all the
organs possessing ultimate, independent power within a
community and, whether these are one or many, they constitute
together the sovereign power in that community.
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Suppose, however, that one of these organs is not
confined within the community. A powerful church, for
instance, governed by a leader who does not belong to the
same state. The term ' sovereign state*, certainly, cannot be
applied to a state in which at least part of the ultimate
power is in the hands of an extra-national body. But
sovereignty still exists within the state, as indeed it does
everywhere. It is the total expression of supreme, or
supreme legal, power in relation to any specified person or
group of persons.
The term ' national sovereignty* must unfortunately be
left ambiguous. Clearly it can either mean that part of
sovereignty within a nation which is in the hands of the
nation's own members, or alternatively it can describe the
principle of leaving in the hands of the nation's members the
sum of sovereignty that is exercised within the nation. Both
interpretations are reasonable; If we follow the second then
'national sovereignty' ceases to exist as soon as some part of
the nation's functions is taken over by an external body. If
we adopt the former interpretation, then 'national sovereignty'
is still a meaningful term even when the state retains power
only in a very restricted sphere. The second definition is
the more misleading, for by declaring that the 'sovereign
state' can be wholly sovereign, or not at ail sovereign, but
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never partly sovereign, it tends by association to revive
the fallacy that sovereignty as such is indivisible.
We pointed out in the introduction to this thesis that
the word ' state' can itself be defined in two ways. It can
denote a certain community, in the same way as the terms
'nation', 'shire', and 'city'; and it can denote whatever
power structure, or group of power structures, exists within
the community. In a world community this two-fold meaning
would remain, whether the term 'state' was used to refer to
the whole community and its power-structure, or was still
applied to smaller communities and their remaining power-
structures, as is the case in the U.S.A.: the term "the
union", perhaps, being used to designate the full community
and its organisation.
Natural law. Natural rights
In defining sovereignty we decided to recognise at least
the possibility that there is a kind of right which transcends
legal right (using the adjective 'legal' to refer to positive
law). This superior right, a moral one, must be determined
by some moral law. 'Natural law* is the term traditionally
used. It would be a difficult one to discard and had better
be adhered to if only for that reason. It is not an ideal
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term. Among those unacquainted with its accepted use it is
as malleable as the description 'the state of nature' -—
it can be used to mean its opposite, the law of the jungle.
Even within its traditional limits it allows dissension,
particularly between those who view it from a religious stand¬
point and those who do not. For instance, is it to be regarded
as the supreme law? If it is thought of as a law discoverable
by human reason, it can be held inferior to divine law, at
least part ox which may be unknowable except by revelation.
At the same time natural law cannot on a religious view
conflict with divine laiv; it is embraced by it. In this
fact lies one hope for a clarification of the term.
The distinction between natural law and divine lav/ (for
those who accept the existence of the latter) must in short
be removed. The associations of natural law with ideas of
conscience and intuition are far too strong for the term to
be acceptable as a definition merely of that part of divine
law which is discovered by human 'reason' in the sense of
unaided intellect, (katurai law is doubtless the law of
♦right' reason, but right reason is more than reason: it is
virtually a synonym for truth, and cannot contradict 'right
intuition'.) Nor is t!ere any need for a distinction, in
political thought, between (a) the supreme law applicable
to man's affairs and (b) the supreme law which embraces it and
also covers matters of which man knows nothing and with which
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he therefore has no direct concern. Natural law may be
recognised as having no superior; as being one and the
same, for human purposes, any divine law.
What are its other characteristics, besides this one
of supremacy?
It may fairly be described as a law which is unwritten.
Literally, of course, it may have been written. A Christian,
for instance, in quoting Antigone's description "The unwritten
and unchanging laws of God", might make the reservation that
the 'unwritten' laws are more than hinted at in the scriptures.
But they are not written in statute books and case bocks. The
Christian's allegiance to them springs from a discovery that
they are in conformity with laws which he first apprehends
through another sense than eyesight or hearing; the laws
of the Bible derive strength from their claim to be the laws
of conscience. We may say then that natural law does not
have to be unwritten, but it is one of its distinctions that
it is unaffected by being so.
Is it unchanging? Or are there "different laws at Rome
and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future"?
Cicero's answer is the common one. "True law...is of
universal application, unchanging and everlasting.... one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and
all times," "" This view is not to be disproved by reference
to the fact that the law of nature has been invoked, at
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different times and among different groups, to champion
conflicting ideas. In the first place, the law may have
been wrongly stretched to deal in particularities; in the
second place, it may have been wrongly interpreted. The
fact is that it is impossible to determine, by any pragmatical
test, whether the natural law is unchanging or not, since its
dictates are apprehended in the last resort by the individual.
It seems reasonable to guess that true 'laws of conscience' do
not change, but this cannot be proved. All that can be said
is that they form the supremely valid law for any person at
any given time.
They form a lav; which is valid, too, in any circumstances:
for example in a state of anarchy. But it would be erroneous
to say that in such a condition natural law steps easily into
the place of positive law. It is positive law, not natural
law, which is characteristically the law of reason (i.e. of
intellect), and in circumstances in which such a law is not
supplied by the community, it must be supplied by the
individual. It remains distinct from natural law, of which
it is of course a detailed application. Natural law, then,
never renders positive law superfluous. The need for the
derivative law is effectively swarned up by Solovyov: "The
p rpose of moral law is that man should live thereby, and man
can live only in society. And the existence of society
depends not upon the perfection of some, but upon the security
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of all. This security is not ensured by the moral law, to
which men with predominantly anti-social instincts are deaf,
but is safeguarded by the compulsory law perceptible even
to them.... Let it be granted that the highest morality
(in its ascetic aspect) makes us indifferent to the prospect
of being killed, maimed or robbed; but that same morality
(on its altruistic side) does not allow us to be indifferent
to letting our neighbours become robbers and murderers or
being robbed and murdered, or to the danger of destruction
to society apart from which an individual cannot live and
strive after perfection. Such indifference would be a clear
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sign of moral death."
The maintenance of this clear distinction between natural
and positive law, in any condition of society, does something
to lessen the weight of what is perhaps the most potent
complaint that can he brought against the concept of natural
law: that it. makes positive law helpless because as Bentham
said it encourages a man, on the ground of conscience, to
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rise up against any law that he happens to dislike. If the
division between natural law and the written laws is kept in
sight, the latter are recognisable as fit subjects for
adjustment by agreement always supposing that their
intention, at least, accords with natural law and personal
resistance to them should seldom be necessary.
Nevertheless the concept of natural law does, in effect,
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confer a right of disobedience to a positive lav/ upon any
individual who earnestly and conscientiously believes that
the positive lav/ in question is morally wrong. The papal
encyclical "Kit Brennender Sorge", in 1937, referred in this
way to "...the so-called natural law, that is written by the
finger of the Creator Himself in the tables of the hearts
of men and v/hich can be read on these tables by sound reason
not darkened by sin and passion. Every positive law, from
whatever lawgiver it may cone, can be examined as to its
moral implications, and consequently as to its moral authority
to bind in conscience, in the light of the commandments of
the natural law." Like a supreme commander who demands
obedience even though it may involve conflict with his
subordinates, natural law calls for unwavering allegiance.
And since it is to be read "in the tables of the hearts of men",
with each individual must rest the task and the right of
deciding when it is his duty to rebel against positive law.
For a brief final summary of natural law, we could do
worse than select a definition of Karitain's. If we omit in
this his reference to the law's discoverability by human
<v
reason, he describes it as "an order «£r disposition.• .according
to which the human will must act in order to attune itself to
the necessary ends of the human being. The unwritten law, or
22k
natural lav/, is nothing more than that."
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Natural 1aw prescribes to the individual his 4uties.
Only incidentally does it describe rights. Hence the utility
of the related concept of natural rights. It is however quite
possible for the natural rights concept to be accepted
independently of that of natural law; indeed in some sense
to supplant the latter. This is mainly a difference of
approach, though by saying that natural rights spring from
the natural law we imply that rights derive from duties,
whereas by placing natural rights first we seem to suggest
that it is the duties which are derivative; It becomes
possible in fact to ignore the duties altogether. This change
of approach was seen in the eighteenth century. In the words
of d'Entr e>ves, "On the eve of the American and French
Revolutions the theory of natural law had been turned into a
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theory of natural rights."
It is claimed by Ritchie that "Natural rights are not
identical with moral rights, because in many cases people
have claimed that they had a. natural right to do things that
were not recognised either by the law of the land or by the
prevalent public opinion or by the conscience of the averare
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individual." Ritchie* s view of moral right is clear enough,
22?
here at least he has in fact already said that it demands
the assent of, or at least the absence of opposition from,
public opinion and we shall differ from it and shall
suggest that the terms * natural right* and 'moral right' are
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interchangeable. Alike they refer to a right which,
whether or not we wish to relate it to natural law, is
ultimately determinable only by the individual and rests on
no sanction by average opinion.
Rights of this kind are, fairly clearly, best confined
to fundamentals. It is true that a man may consider he has a
moral right to, say, organise a street procession; but others
may disagree with him although fully supporting the principle
of the liberty of the subject. "The term 'natural rights' is
generally restricted to those of them which are conceived of
as wore fundamental than others, from which the others may
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be deduced, or to which the others are only auxiliary."
Such rights at their simplest are of the kind laid down in
the Declaration of Independence or in the 17$9 Declaration
of the Rights of Man: the former saying that "among" man's
inalienable rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; the latter that "the natural arid imprescriptible
rights of man... are liberty, property, security, and
resistance of oppression". One at least even of these basic
rights is easily challengeable: the right of property,
omitted from the French Declaration. The right of life
(also, whether or not significantly, missed out of the French
Revolutionary Declaration) is the only one of these rights
upon which interpretations could hardly differ. "Liberty" is
vague, and endless argument is possible about the conditions
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needed for "the pursuit of happiness". It is clear enough that
there is little hope of agreement on a pre-cise definition
even of the most basic natural rights, still less on their
implications.
This fact helps to show that whether the natural right
concept is regarded as a derivative of that of natural lav/
or as a substitute for it, its characteristics are those of
that law. Natural right must override legal right; one
expects that natural rights are unchanging but this cannot
be pragmatically proved; natural rights are essentially
unwritten and the individual must ultimately define them for
himself.
Nevertheless, in view of the importance of this element
of individual judgement, it is worth noting that by using
natural right as a substitute concept for natural law, we
tend to enlarge in one respect the scope of individual duty.
Under the natural law theory a man1s only duty is to obey
that law. Supposing, for example, that he believes natural
lav/ to sanction property, he must regard it as his duty not
to steal. There is no question here of any duty not to be
stolen from. If on the other hand he puts natural right
first, his view on property can only be expressed by saying
that every man has a right not to be stolen from. The
difference in emphasis makes it more likely (though not
inevitable) that his resulting idea of personal duty in this
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connection will include not only passive refusal to obey any
positive law which instructs him to steal, but also active
resistance to any infringement of his own right not to be
stolen from. The same view may arise from the natural law
concept, but only through a lengthier deduction.
Such a difference in emphasis is important. For in the
sphere of practical politics che theories of natural law and
natural right make no headway except by being translated
into power, yet this power can be affective negatively and
may not bo able otherwise to realise itself. Mrs. Swart
Lewis has recently commented that "In the recognition of
insurrection and tyrannicide as rightful sanctions against a
ruler, medieval political thought faced and accepted the fact
that the ultimate judge of the legality of authority must be
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the conscience of private individuals." Modern political
theory, especially in a world community, might have to 'face
and accept' the same fact without having resort to any
possibility of insurrection. Indeed except in 'the conscience
of private individuals' the longest current of political
theory could itself become unknown.
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6. THE UNLIMITED COMMUNITY
There exists hardly any political theory designed for,
or adapted to,, the unlimited community. Political science
as a study seems in no hurry to bestow patronage on the
threatened discipline known as international relations. It
continues to suppose that political thought is concerned with
the nation state: an assumption comprehensible enough in
previous centuries, when to theorise upon a theoretical
world-state was plainly a profitless exercise.
But the practical scene has vastly changed. In Sir
Stafford Cripps' metaphor, the atomic bomb has telescoped
history. Innumerable other factors have helped it to do so.
A sober estimate of the present situation is one such as
that made in 1953 by G.A. Borgese, one of the world-constitution
framers at Chicago in 194$: "At the present sta, e Zeno the
Stoic or Dante the Christian, who 'dreamed' of the World
State, are the realists. It is the custodians of the age of
nations who are the dreamers —- though no Utopians in the
vanguard acception of the word, for what they dream is the
..230nightmare of yesternights."
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The main impetus towards world community is coming,
it may be said, not from theory but from facts, in particular
from the fact of a threat to the continued existence of human
life on the planet a threat which as many believe (i.e.
of course, theorise) world union would remove. But at every
stage in the process of world unification fact and theory
are entangled; the existing political situation affects the
character which men wish the unlimited community to have;
their aims affect the methods by which unity is achieved;
these methods in turn will plainly affect at least the
initial character of the world state.
Let us glance first at some of the forces making for
world union and then at the alternative ways in which, as a
result of some or other of these forces, union seems most
likely to come about.
Forces making for unity.
First, there is the perennial demand for unity on
abstract grounds. In small everyday affairs men do not
unite without an ostensible reason for doing so; unity is
not an end in itself. But the setting up of a world
government has always been, in the eyes of some, an end.
To them the search for harmony is the search for unity.
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A world government is a necessary symbol of the brotherhood
of man. Thus Dante: "Therefore the human race is at its
best and most perfect when, so far as its capacity allows,
it is most like to God. But mankind is most like to God
when it enjoys the highest degree of unity, since He alone
is the true ground of unity — hence it is written: 'Hear,
0 Israel, the Lord thy God is one.' But mankind is most at
one when the whole human race is drawn together into complete
unity, which can only happen when it is subordinate to one
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Prince, as is self-evident."
Dante's view is easily criticised. Mankind may be "most
like to God when it enjoys the highest degree of unity", but
what sort of unity? Not all unity can be said to have a
spiritual value, surely; there exists a false, or mock,
unity which commonly finds its expression in a pretended or
enforced unanimity and uniformity. Gabrrel Marcel, for one,
has written especially strongly on this. "We have every
reason for believing that the unification of the world, from
the moment at which it could be effected at the level and
from the point of view of power, would coincide with the
world's destruction. If one does not allow oneself to be
snared by mere words, one sees very clearly that such a material
unification has no relationship at all to the only kind of
unity which has spiritual importance, that of hearts and
232minds." Dante may be over-estimating the extent to which
governmental machinery can shape the City of God. The world
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community could presumably be ruled by the spirit of Christ
or by that of Antichrist.
The abstract argument for unity is, then, dubious. The
practical arguments seem stronger, more pressing, and wider
in appeal. The nations have become economically inter¬
dependent; it is a commonplace that the world shrinks in
effective size daily, in the sense that distances are more
quickly traversed and that happenings in one part of the
globe more and more surely have repercussions in the other
parts. Wars are hard to localise and it is clearly possible
that a major war with modern weapons would extinguish
civilisation as we know it and perhaps end the life of the
human race. There is a need for a central authority to co¬
ordinate national policies and, above all, to ensure peace.
Two sorts of argument can be brought against this
practical demand for unity. The first has to io with the
probable nature of a world state once established. It mi ht
be a tyranny, one may say, and the probability (or even
possibility) of a universal tyranny is worse than the
possibility (or even probability) of universal destruction.
All sorts of perspectives are possible on this. The other
argument is that although a supranational government has
long been regarded as a means of preventing wars, it would
not in fact do so; that it is to be classified with the
many chimerical projects for peace of the past. Wars
between nations or groups would continue, it is contended;
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they would merely have to be renamed civil wars. This is
possible. Bat civil wars only take place when government
breaks down, i.e. when government becomes for some reason
or other impossible. A government that remains more than
nominal prevents war within its territory. Is such an
effective government possible on a world scale?
On this point there can be little doubt. Such is the
scope of modern weapons that it is possible to envisage a
supranational authority which, once established and in
control of arms, could keep peace in the world by force
alone. The nations may not wish to set up such a government.
But in itself it is practicable. The modern ease of transport
and communication fully facilitates a world administration
and a world police. It is irrelevant here to complain that
there is no sufficient 'sense of community': this fact, if
it is a fact, only affects the kinds of world state that can
be established, perhaps limiting them to one a despotism.
It is less irrelevant to bring forward the argument that
it is man's biological destiny to live in a closed society;
this is akin to Marcel's warning that the achievement of
world union might coincide with Doomsday. Bit such warnings are
no answer to a conviction that human affairs demand a union.
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Methods of achieving this unity.
There seem to be three highroads to a world community.
The most favoured is federalism; the most presently
probable (tragically, to speak mildly) seems to be through
a conflagration; the most easily accomplished would
presumably be through the pacifism of one of the two chief
blocs of nations, resulting at worse in absorption and
domination by the other bloc.
Federalism differs from both the other methods in that
it leaus towards a world government which, theoretically at
least, will somehow be equably constituted between the
nations and will serve moral ends. It is not surprising then
that most prophets of the unlimited community favour it,
and paint for us the vision of Tennyson, in Locksley Hall,
of "the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the world."
Indeed some advocates of federation almost seem to have been
drawn towards it by a fear that it is the only alternative to
world despotism. We have mentioned that such a despotism,
in the view of some, would be a worse fate for the world
than annihilation. Lionel Curtis, for example, declared in
1948: "I see no other road to a world government, except
by creating a world despotism, which, in my view, would be
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worse than the total destruction of human life on this earth."
This may seem a surprising standpoint for have not
nationsstates outgrown innumerable tyrannies, and is not the
15 1
chance of a world state doing likewise enough to justify
the purchase of human existence at, if need be, a high
material price? — but it is not an uncommon one. Bertrand
Russell, for example, seemed to support it when he said in
the same year that he would prefer to a tyranny "all the
234
destruction" involved in war. This, certainly, was before
the development of the hydrogen bomfe; destruction then held
less threat of being total.
Whether or not world federation is the only practicable
alternative to despotism, federation as a system does offer,
once established, some continuing safeguard of liberty by
its separation of powers. Power is at the same time
sufficiently centralised to produce a unified state, distinct
from the loosely tied group of nations that is called a
confederation. (In a confederation, central power derives
from local powers; this ceases to be true in a federation,
though it is doubtless too much to say that the position is
reversed.) So far so good. A world federation would however
be not quite comparable with any federation of the past; in
addition to the often-posed question of whether sufficient
sense of community exists in the world to make federation
feasible, it is as well to remember that the security at
which world federation aimed would necessarily (if we assume
the absence of inter-planetary conflicts) be purely
internal: there would so be lacking another of the factors,
external danger, that spurred on the federalists of the
United States.
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The second possible way to world union would appear to
lie through a "war", unprecedented in its scope and nature.
We may reasonably expect that a disaster of this kind \>/ould
arouse an urgent determination, not only among any 'victors'
but among all men left alive and left or made sane, to see
that such occurrences were impossible in the future. In any
case it would produce a chaos after which the setting up of
a world government, most probably starting as a dictatorship
by the strongest party, would be likely to seem a very
pedestrian development.
This approach to union has no advocates (one hopes)
but some reluctant prophets. Some of these may base their
estimate of probabilities on the fact that man often behaves
irrationally, or on the fact that integration between states
has in the past more often come about by warlike means than
otherwise. Or they may be impressed by Arnold Toynbee's
examination of the typical circumstances that precede what
he chooses to term universal states (not to be identified
with the unlimited community, which of course has never
existed). Toynbee considers that in every advanced
civilisation a universal government becomes the last
alternative to chaos. Like Spengler he associates such
a government with civilisation's last phase, a process of
decay being under way already.
These prognostications may encourage some people, who
do not find federalism a practical proposition, to argue
that the most practicable alternative to an appalling war
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is unilateral pacifiss: the third route towards unity that
we have mentioned. The pacifist viewpoint is one of which
rather less has been heard in the past than mi ht have been
expected, particularly since it has, of course, some
adherents on purely moral grounds as well as among those
who wish to hasten the coming of world government. If it
were widely adopted, pacifism would foster the achievement
of unity by agreement. If it were adopted only by a
minority among the major powers, it might tend to foster
unification by conquest. We are speaking of ' national*
pacifism -— of pacifism adopted by a national community.
'Individual* pacifism is a distinct matter, though it too
could presumably foster world union in one of these tv/o ways,
if it became popular.
Leaving aside the ethics of killing, the chief
argument brought against the pacifist policy is that it
would give rise not only to domination over pacifist powers
by other poxvers, but to domination by the most tyrannical
forces, since the will to dominate may well be stronger
among these than among non-pacifist but 'liberal* powers.
So the pursuit of pacifism amounts, on the face of the
matter, to a sacrifice of freedom: a sacrifice which in
the opinion of many is too great a price to pay for unity.
On the other hand any kind of world government might carry
within it a similar possibility of tyranny, and the question
arises whether human diversities and freedoms can be
maintained without any help from national barriers.
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Unity and Freedom.
One of the normal conditions of freedom, as Humboldt
and Mill particularly emphasised, is a diversity of
situations, in the past this diversity has been sustained
largely by the existence of independent nations. But
diversity of this kind is diversity en bloc. It provides
humanity as a whole with varying forms of excellence, but
it tends to deprive each separate individual of the ability
to share in more than some of them. Under nationalism, in
other words, human individuality is largely conditioned.
The usual trend of history has been to remove this
conditioning to enlarge each man's scope for , ersonal
*
knowledge and decision. The growth of an unlimited
community would accord with such a trend. Human progress
in all spheres has contributed to this greater power of
choice: in the explorations which have pushed out the limits
of knowledge, in the scientific advances that leave man less
bonded to the elements, in the curiosity that tries to bring
together the progress made in different countries and different
fields, but all this progress is not necessarily, as Kant
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seemed to hope it was, progress to a higher moral state.
As the individual's ran&e of choice increases, he tends
to choose less. In a world state, the maintenance of diversity
would depend almost too much on each individual citizen.
It is in the situation confronting a world-citizen that the
Rousseauist and Lockeian traditions of political theory
reach their ultimate conflict. For it is no longer nations
or governments which will choose between the two ideals.
The conflict is a conflict within each individual.
The individual can surrender to the community his
responsibility for his own beliefs and actions. He can
exchange independence for security: and if he can prevail
on everyone else to do likewise, his security, for the
first time in history, may oe absolute. Now if he can
convince hi self that in doing this he is not sacrificing
his ideals to the achievement of security, but is actually
taking the true road to the realisation of his ideals, he
may believe that he has produced a perfect society. For
this state of affairs our own term is False Unity.
False unity provides what in Rousseau's terminology
can plausibly be called a general will. Tocqueville first
saw it in the making, over a century ago. Truth is sought
through (temporal) unity, rather than the reverse. In the
process, both truth and true unity may be lost. What some
modern writers call the 'mass mind' can quite easily regard
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itself as representing a general will. In modern conditions
the general will does not necessarily have to search for
means of expressing itself; it expresses itself by removing
from the human mind, quite intangibly, viewpoints which
are not in accordance with its own. This is what Toequeville
was the first great political philosopher to see. The
community starts to make choices without realising that it
is making them; without realising that it had any alternative
course of action. Dissentients are not openly tyrannised
over; except as 'lunatics' they do not exist. Vox populi
becomes vox dei even to those who repudiate the principle of
its doing so; vox populi speaks to them from within, and
it speaks as commonsense. While national divisions remain
vox populi is suspect, because commonsense is known to speak
with different voices in different lands. In the unlimited
community it would be one voice, harder than ever to
distinguish from conscience. Like Orwell's Winston Smith
vdia came to love Big Brother, the citizen mi&ht truly
believe, whether he had heard of mousseau or not, that the
general will "cannot err".
The Lockeian individualist, in such an environment,
might have a curiously discouraging task: that of struggling
against a coercion which only himself could see, and of
seeking to replace a disspiriting harmony between shadows
by a system of non-aggressive individuality which would
have the uses but not the drawoacks of the warlike conflicts
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of the past# It might seem to him that false unity had
in effect crucified truth. It might also seem that, the
public conscience having reached such omniscience, there could
be little point in the continued existence of human beings
as separate entities. One fancies that neither of these
reflections would necessarily make our Lockeian philosopher
pessimistic; and perhaps that a living Jean-Jacques itousseau
would be one of the first to join him, in rejecting the
infallibility of the general will of the world.
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••o, 1, 1356), A reprint of Hunton* s Treatise had come out in 1680,
the year of Pilsner's Patriarchs m which was centered Locke's First
Treatise.
It is worth mentioning that the Treatise, 1643, and its
Vindication. 1644, are Kunton's only known works. It is customary
to say (as does the siiotfoamry of national Biography ami acre
recently John Bessie, Hobfees end Ms Critics, 1951, p. 101, footnote)
that he wrote another work called Jus Re.au®, now apparently lost.
Jus Uemxw. (1645) is however not lost? it was written not by"P.H."
but by "!?»P.* i. e. Henry Parker, whose Jus P&suli was published
in the preceding year.
1?>3, ■•■■eccevI Treatise, section 208.
12?. Sterling P, Laasprecht, The •'oral and Folitioal Philosophy of John Locke
(O.H.A,, H.Y,, Columbia. Ph.D. thesis), 191®, fp. 156,157*
128. G.'S* Vaughan, Studies in the History of Political Philosophy, 1925,
Tel* I, Vaughan judges that according to Locke 34 in moral setters at
axy rate, tbe individual is entitled to dictate his aim will to the
State? to refuse hi© assent «•— and. we can only conclude, his
obediMM* also —— to any law or executive act that floes not square
with the divinely ordained cod© which each man finds written in
his heart and which fe# alone has the right t© 'interpret'." ^Pp.X71,
172.) Can such a right to disobey (and suffer in consequence) very
•veil fee called a right to "dictate""J
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129. oooii-3 Treatise, section 235.
130. Sir hebsrt filiwtr, Patriarchs. 1680. (p.252 in T.I. Cook's edition of
John Locke; Two Treatises of 0-orermeni (tf. . A. . Kafner), 1947).
131. Lastapreeht, op. cit., p. 157.
152. FI laser, Patriarchy (is Cook's edition. op. oit.. p,2o7 .
133. first Treatise, ch. X (is Cook's edition, op. cit,, 9,17),
134* ■ f-ocanci Treatise., section 149,
135. Q/f the coacsente of Professor Cook, a wor2d~gcweraRent sympathiser,
who in prefacing his edition of Locke (op. cit.) pioneering!,?
expresses 'astenisbraent® at Locke's approach to the conduct of
interna ttonal affairs.
136. fecaafl Treatise. section X45.
( 1 U-£33S aiD HOtTCfTcATT*)
137. Otto Sierke, hs.tu.ral |g| and the Theory of : ociety. 1934, Vol. I, p. 198,
and notes in Vol. II5 pp. 394, 395.
138. Christian clff, Ju® Centiua .Pethodo Scientlfica Pertractsturn
(reproduced frost the 1764 cdn. with trans, by Joseph H. Drake, 1934,
FoX, II), Prolegomena, section 9.
139. Ib., do., section 10,
14.0. lb., do., section 20.
141. lb., do., section 15.
142. lb., do,, section. 21.
143. iws&raiel Kant, 'The Batumi Principle of the Political Order' (1734),
7th proposition* in trans, by ?•'. Hastie, Kant's rinciples of
Politics, 1891, p. 16.
144*. lb., 4th proposition, do,,fp,93 10.
345. Ib., 6th proposition, do,, pp.14, 15.
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146. 'The ■ rinoi/le of <''regress*; in Hastie,fp.71, 72,
147. ' ©roetusal Peace* (1795), Definitive .Article 2 « in Haatie, p.94.
343. la the aws® ©saay; Paatie,jp.99, IOC.
149. Kant appears to have thought Fichte something of an impostor.
Schopenhauer distinguished Piohte*® "winetbaggeryB from Hegel's
* ohaurls tanry" ♦ There is an emphatic modern expos? tion on these
lines in K..R. Popper, The Open - ociety and its "ncmines. 1945,
Vol. II, p»52, and note $8 to oh*12, p.293. Popper is annoyed
that such * clams" as Fiohtc and Hegel are taken seriously. He
assume here that Fichte was by no means the fraudulent time-server
that he «n apparently be painted, (In erne of his lectures he
does seem long-winded, but if this makes a "rindbag" the distinction
between *?;inlbaggery,i and charlatanry is a fundamental one).
150. Quoted by H.C. Vngelbrecht, -Joharai Gottlieb fflchte; 'A study of his
politics! writings with special reference to his Nationalism*,
(U.S.A., N.Y., Columbia Ph.D. thesis), 1953, p.97.
151. Ib., p.99,
X§2, -J.th Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation. trans. R.P. Jones and
G.H. 'furhbull (Chicago), 1922, section 2C4, p.232,
.153. "his belief that a national literature ceases to live when the nation
is no longer politically independent is not an incidental on© for
Piehte, since (apparently following Sohlegel) he sees language as
the basis of natioml character. C/f Addresses, op, oit.. section 190.
154. Giuseppe M&ssini, trans, in Joseph Massini; his Life. ."rltin&s. and
olitleal • riaciplea. with Intro, by «L» Garrison (U.S.A., N.Y.),
1S72, |^.265, 26€, (Oh. VI, 'Records of the Brothers Bandiera',
1842-1844},
155. lb., quoted in Garrison's introduction, p. xxil.
156. rittesn in 1349. Quoted by Haas Koran, Prophets and Peoples (U.S.A., N.Y.),
1946, p.93.
157. 'International Policy*, 1871; trans, in the Fortnightly Review, April I877.
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15$, Kegel, : hiloeonhy of Light, tram, 7.M, Knox, 1942; in para. 331.
159. ".g., la ths *r«aark' to para. 333.
160. Op, cit.. in para. 322.
161. lb. , in the addition to para. 324.
162. Ib., in the 'remark' to para, 324.
'153. IV*. Karat, in a discussion on 'Kegel and Prussian!®®* -with E.F. Carritt,
the closing articles, in Philosophy. Vol. XV", July 1940.
164. Op. cit., in the addition to para. 324.
165. Leonard *?, Kcbhctxee, the Vetapfrysdcal Theory of the ."-tate, 1918, p. 112,
166. 'i'.K. C'reea, 'Lectures or the .Principles of Political obligation', in
Larks of Thoisas "Hill '.'-men, ed, 33. L, Wettleship, Vol, II, 1886,
in para, 163, p.473.
167. Ib., in para, 169, p.479.
168. Ib,, In pars, 170, p.48c»
169. Th., in para. 175, p.435.
170. Hobhcuse, op, cit., p. lOfc.
172, "J an?, interested in Hobhewse*© characterisation of me, or i® it the
reviewer's? It doesn't matter. I don't think I shall read his
book —— T dcn't feel I learn saich fro® hi®, and books are
expensive since the mr began, and time Is not cheap," — Boaanquet
in a letter to Plater (Rector of Yeovil), Jan. 26th 1919. In
•Jf.B. Muirhe&d, Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends. 1935, p.203.
172, B. Bosanquet, 'Patriotism in the Perfect State', in The International
\
Crisis in its thical and Psychological Aspects (lectures by various
speakers), 1913, p. 145.
173, Helen Bosenqnet. Bernard Bosanquett A Short Acoamt of hia life. 1924,
p. 136.
174, In his Poctal and Xnterm.tioxfjl6ea.ls. 1917.
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175. C/f note $3*
176* Xdeals (op. elt«), p»2?l*
177. lb., p.m.
170# Xb., P«'- 57«
179. Ib,, p. 295.
100* lb*, P. 233.
131. Heinrleh vcsa Tsreitsehlce, i olitica. trans. Blanche 'Htigdal© and Torben
fis Bills, 17X6, Vol I, p.65*
2B2. Ib,, p.70#
133. Ib.,^.22, 23.
XSW Ib., p. 19,
165, Ib., do.
166. Ib., p.26.
107, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engele, 'Manifesto of the Commist Party* (1848),
the 108f trans., in Vadle Burns (ed.), A Handbook of Marxism. 1935,
7P«43 ,44.
183. As appears to do Solomon F» Bloom, in The V"orId of Nations. 'A study of
the national implications in the work of Karl H&rx' (U.S. A. , Columbia
V»P. , *♦*,}, 1S4X,
189* Jeremy Bentha®, 'Principles of Morals and legislation', in W. Harrison
(ea.), A Mgftjytenfc on. Government, etc., 1948, Ch, XVII, para. 25, p.426.
190. Bentham, Massy I in 'Principles of International Law*, in John Bewaring
(ed.)» the y?orfca of Jeregty Bentham. Vol. II, 1343. This was the
•first publication of the 'Principles', the ITS. of which were dated
1736 to 1739. The essay on war is Mo. Ill and that on perpetual
peace is Mo. IV. (The latter appeared in the 'Peace Classics*
series, 3339}•
175
191. la a letter, w rltten just after the appearance of the first two
volumes, at "'eaocracy in America. quoted by CJeorge W. Pierson,
9cooveyf lie and reaumont la Asserica, 1938, p. 750.
192. Alexis rie T-ooqueville, Democracy in America. (1835 and 1840), the
translation by Henry Peeve abridged by B.S, Ccwaager (O.tJ.F.),
1553, p.105.
193. IK, P. 102,
194. IK, p. 104.
195. Ib., p.285,
196. Jcihr< Stuart Mill, Representative Poverment» 186.1, oh. XVI, (In the
Pent edition, 194'+, p.364).
197. ri®tter to Mrs. :• alsted. In The Letters of John feart Mill, ed. with
intro, by Hugh S.E. Slliot, 1910, Vol. IT, p.293.
UN$* Representative ftovuraaeat. oh. XVI, , 361)»
199. Ib., eh. OT7I. (p.371).
200. lb,, do, (p.373).
201. J.5v.fi. BfelbergrXcton, IhwC Actons 'Nationality* (1862), in The History
of Preedcae and other essays. 1907, p.289.
202. Ib., p»290*
203. IK, p.298.
("?tn: '■■^ICION ot> > - ".Kreciaar)
204. As is pointed cut by, e.g., Harold P. Lasewell and. Abraham Kaplan,
'
a?or and j'ociaty. 1952, p.75: 3'"he ooiicspt of poirer is perhaps the
aost fUndaoi&nial is the whole of political science: the political
process is the shaping, distribution, and exercise of power (in a
wider sense, of all the deference values, or of influence in general)."
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Or by w.A. Rbbsoe, Political Science (TORSCO), 19%, p.IBs "The
focus of interest of the political scientist is clear and unambiguous,
it centres tm the struggle to .gain or retain patmv, to exercise
power or influence over others, or to resist that exercise."
205. -'a 'fa jural hav-; a chrlatleR Oecorafderation. ed« by A*a. Vidler and
fal* "rhitehcas#, 194$# P*34.
20$. fhosaas D. Weidan, States and Morals, 1946, p.203.
20?. Tt isigfei be asked whether there la a difference between this definition
of pester and such & am m C.S, Merri&m's, in. political Fewer.
19%# p.20, (quoted by Lasswell and Kaplan, on. cit.. p. 76) whioh
declares that *.♦» power entails only effective control over policy;
the means by which the control is made effective are many and varied."
UerrHum previously makes the point that power seed not involve
violence, and with this we have agreed. But in so far as the term is
useful in political theory, it must imply a possibility of some
sort of constraint, k power of * control over policy* that springs
entirely from, the free consent of all who are affected by the policy
is not power at all in the present sens®. If a mm can build a
pyramid because a thousand volunteers are longing to help his to do
so, he has the power to build a pyramid —— but this, so long as it
affects nobody else, has nothing to do with polities* Bo long as
there is no elaob of wills the Question of political power does not
arise.
203. ' .J. TJeea, 'the -Theory of Borereigaty Restated*, in Mind. Vol. IIX,
1350, would alios? the existence of & sort of authority that he calls
* coercive*, "where a ml© obliges a person to act in virtue of its
being enforced, usually with a penalty attached, is the event of
disobedience.* Slut lees seems to assume that his coercive authority
will he associated with seme sort of right; otherwise he would be
saying that power, by itself, may be termed a sort of authority.
(Such a use of the word authority would certainly not be original;
eft as sm illustration Charles I at his trial, quoted in The Armies
Hodest Intelligencer» week ending 26th January 1649: "Wo® I would
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know by what Authority, 1 aeane, tefhll; there are mny unlawfull
Authorities is the world, Theeves and Robbers by the high ways.,#")
20y» Eees, Q;.-» olfr,
213, Stanley I. Bean, *fhs irs«s of "Sovereignty"*, in Political tudles.
Vol. XXX dot 2, June 1955.
211. Harold J, I^aski, A Qraraa&r of • clitics. 1925, >44: rXt •< ould be of
lasting benefit to political science if the -whole concept of
ooversigaty were eiirrfflodered. I at in fact with which we are
Sealing is power..."
212. Jac<g»*s Aarit&ia, Han and the tate. 1954, p.26: "It is ay contention
that political philosophy must get rid of the word, as well as the
concept, of Sovereignty.,,"
215. Jam©t (Viscount) Bryce, Afrudiea in History and Jurisprudence. 1901,
Vol, IT, 3asay X: »Tbe 'Mature of Sovereignty*.
234. 'teviJ >3. Ritchie, 'On the Conception of Sovereignty', in Xfrrwin and
■ffiWI&fc.Jlfo» ^3.
215, Do., p.253.
216, Bsyce, e;> -sit.. Rssaay X, 10,
217, 1»". „ aafi A.-J, Oarlyle, -leuiaeval Political Theory In toe Best, Vol, VI,
1*419.
213. Bertrams de Jeaveral, Pemmt. «&> 1952, Book I,
219. fMs is a traditional vie?-, In mediaeval legal doctrine, "Anyone could
justly claim to be sovereign if, in any particular matter, there was
no appeal from Ms to any higher authority." (Georg Schwurseriberger,
•Sovereignty: Ideology and Reality*, in The Year Book of . orid
Affair.-;. 1950, }
220. Cicero, '"e Heiaablioa. Ill, 22,
221. 'Morality &®3 beg&l Justice*, ^ A S^iovyov ^nthcTrngy, ed» by E.L. Frank ,
trans. Buddingtm, 1950, 201, 202.
222. Jeremy Bentbam, A graatmt en Government {first puhfi, 1776), Oh. IV,
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para, 19,
22% encyclical *Mit Brermender forge*, 14th Maroh 1957: quoted in N. Mioklem,
fhe Theology of I:'oXities,PE. 30, 31 (and partly in de JouveneX, op.
oit,),
324, Jacques Barltain, the Rights of Man and Natural Law. 1954, p»35.
3i\. ■, c*"strives. Natural La>'•. 1951, p»6u.
226. R.&. Ritchie, Natural Bights. 1395, p.BO.
227, Unless Ritchie chained his views between 1893 and 1395, his concept
of rights ~ or Ms expression of it seems muddled. In the
passages mentioned be says? that natural and moral rights cannot be
identical, because people have often claimed that natural rights
are ascertainable without reference to society's opinion. But does
be admit such a. claim? He seems not to do so. Since he involves
1Mb lie ©pinion in the determination of moral rights, one v.uuld
expect him to involve it in that of natural rights also: and in
his essay 'She Rights of Minorities* (in Darwin and Kegel, etc.. 1393,
p.232) he in fact says "Eights are the creation of society... When
we speak cf 'natural rights', we really mean those rights which we
think to be the very least that a well-organised society should
secure to its members?,85 It rather looks as though Kitchie, also,
broadly Identified moral and natural rights, but — the opposite
of our mn view on the® —- regarded all such rights as existing
only by society's sanction. On his view there can be a duty of
resistance to society, but not a right.
223. Ritchie, op. cit. (Natural Rights). do.
229. '.v'art Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas. 1954, Vol, I, p.249.
(*jm umsmiTED Gommn')
2.30. -".A. Borgese, ■■•'oucdatlons of the " orld Republic (U.S.A., Chicago T7,P.),
1953, p. 18.
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As bibliographies on world government axenot as yet frequently found,
a few notes on other books may not be cut of place here. Qm of the
more comprehensive studies is Frederick L. Fchuman, The Comoro
wealth of -'an (U.F.A., Knopf, K.Y.), 1952, The extent to which
fear can create a feeling of unity is questioned by feinhold
ftlettthy in •The Myth of 7©rid Government', a paper reprinted in Hans
J. M»rgeathau and Kenneth w« Thompson, eds., ;Principles and ; rob leas
of International Politics; selected readings (17.;.A., Knopf) , 1950•
In the same work P.M. Hutchins puts a different view, advocating
world government as a way to promote the world 'community* that
sous writers believe mat oome first. Crane Brinton, From Many One.
(n.v.A., Harvard tj. h»), 1948, is a partly historical survey of the
unification of nations, Thomas I. Cook, 'Theoretical Foundations of
orld Government*, in The '.eview of olitica (U.S.A.), Vol, 12 Ho: 1,
January 19%', argues that a world state would foster the liberty
of the citizen. L.P. Jacks, in a pamphlet called The Idea of a
FcrlJ Community, ?1950, goes further; when not comparing the idea
of such a cossanrlty with the idea of a university, Dr Jacks
compares it to the Hew Jerusalem, the City of God. But he does in
a way Justify this by pronouncing that men must shed the qualities
of bad eitisens before a world caaasunity can be possible. Lionel
Curtis, The On«*n Road to Freedom. 1950; Emery Saves, The Anatomy of
er/Q&j Gerard J, langone, The Idea and Practice of vorld Government
(t»«. ,A», Columbia U,P.), 1951; and The Atomic Age, by M.L. Oliphant
am others, 1949, are other relevant general works. More specialised
studies include the Chicago Preliminary Draft of a V. orld Constitution.
*&, Borgese and others (U.S.A., Chicago U.F.), 1948} L.J. Cohen,
Principles of orM Citizenship; Josef Pieper, She Sgd of Time. 1954
(outlining the traditional doctrine of the reign of an Antichrist);
' 'he v orld Oggggunity, ed. uincy ! right (U.S.A., Chicago U.P.),
!%&i $,"a Sari®, 'H.G. Sella, British Patriot in Search of a t.orld
State', in Patlomlism and. Interaationalisia ... ed, P.M. Karie
(U.S.A., Columbia U.p.) 1950; and two books surveying past projects
for world peace: ir John A.R, Marriott, Ca^momealth or •■na.rchyt.
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1339 „ and ylvester J. Bemleben, i lam for arid eaee through Six
Centuries (U.&»A., Chicago U.P.), 1943. (Most of the plans discussed
in these two hooks are based on the retention of sovereignty by
individual states). Se® also th© short work by Edward Shanks, The
Universal "&r and the Universal State. 1946,
The basic work on federal union is Clarence K. : treit, Union Mow.
1933. •;.S, Curry treated the amte subject csore briefly in The Case
for Federal Un-tcn. 1939,
Many modern publications an federalism are distributed by
Federal Union, Ltd. (20 Buckingham Street, W.C.2), founded in 1938.
(This body, th© strongest organisation in Britain working for world
government, is associated with the World Movement for " orld Federal
Ocverament; on a parliamentary level It has ties with the British
larliaaentary Association for World Government, which belongs to the
Iorld Association of Parliamentarians for World Government.)
Annual bibliographies on these themes are to be found in the Peace
fear Book published by the National Peace Council.
Especially from the viewpoint of political philosophy, perhaps
the best book yet published on the subject of world union is one
which is seldom referred to: Sri Aurobinio, The Ideal of Human
Unity (i ri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry), first published 1919,
second (revised) edition 1930.
231. .Dante, De I'onarchia. Book I, viii. (f'roa the translation by Donald
Nicholl, 19%).
232. Gabriel Marcel, gen Ugairast Humanity. 1952, pp.205, 204.
233* In The Atostio Age. 1349, p. 126.
2%. Do., p.93.
